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Appellee and Defendant Marc Richard Hansen ("Hansen") 
respectfully submits this Brief of Appellee. The time for filing 
the Brief of Appellee was extended to July 18, 1997 pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 26 (a) and the Stipulation for 
Extension of Time dated June 9, 1997. 
!• JURISDICTION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court's 
"Ruling On: (1) Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Defendant To Sign 
Trust Agreement And For Certain Other Relief; And (2) Plaintiff's 
Motion For Judgment For Delinquent Child Care Costs And For Other 
Relief" ("Ruling"), because the Ruling is not a final order or 
judgment. Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (1997). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the 
district court's Ruling, which denied two postjudgment motions in 
a divorce proceeding and left the matters presented by those 
motions open for future determination by the district court? 
This issue is governed by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (1997). 
B. Whether the district court erred in denying the 
postjudgment motions of Appellant-Plaintiff Jane Ann Taylor 
("Taylor") to compel Hansen to execute a trust agreement and make 
payments to Taylor, when the relief sought was contrary to the 
stipulated Judgment and Decree of Divorce ("Decree")? The 
standard of appellate review of the district court's 
interpretation of the stipulated Decree is the correction of 
error standard. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60(Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) . The standard of appellate review of the district 
court's findings of fact is the clearly erroneous standard. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The standard of appellate review of the district court's 
determinations that Taylor was not entitled to the reimbursement 
of a deduction for the children's health insurance premiums or an 
award of her costs and attorney fees is the abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); Soter's 
v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993); 
Peterson, 818 P.2d at 1310. 
C. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Hansen the 
costs and attorney fees he incurred in defending Taylor's motion 
to compel him to execute a trust agreement contrary to the Decree 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11? The standard of appellate 
review of the district court's conclusion that Taylor violated 
Rule 11 is the correction of error standard. Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The 
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standard of appellate review of the sanction imposed by the 
district court is the abuse of discretion standard. Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Taylor v.. Estate of Taylor, 770 P. 2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
D. Whether Hansen should be awarded costs and attorney fees 
on appeal? The award of costs and attorney fees on appeal is 
governed by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33. Utah R. App. P. 
33(a) (1997) . 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent portions of the following statutes and rules, 
which are determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal, are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah R. App. P. 3 (1997) 
Utah R. App. P. 33 (1997) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (1997) 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 6-404 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-401 (1993 Replacement) 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402 (1993 Replacement) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.17 (1995) 
-3-
3IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is an appeal from the denial of two postjudgment 
motions in a divorce proceeding. The district court denied the 
motions because they improperly sought to compel Hansen to 
execute a trust agreement and make payments to Taylor in 
contravention of the stipulated Decree. Thetrial court also 
denied Taylor's request for costs and attorney fees and awarded 
Hansen costs and attorney fees under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
11. The Ruling is attached as Addendum B. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
Taylor filed her Complaint for divorce on August 4, 1995. 
R. 1-4. She was represented in the divorce proceeding by James 
P. Cowley and Pamela Martinson of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy. R. 1-4, 65-66. After Hansen answered the Complaint 
and produced the personal and business records requested by 
Taylor's attorneys, Hansen's deposition was taken on December 5, 
1995. R. 5-9, 61. The parties then negotiated a comprehensive 
settlement of all of the claims and issues in the divorce 
proceeding. 
The settlement terms were incorporated into a stipulated 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce ("Decree")and Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") drafted by 
Taylor's attorneys. The stipulated Decree, R. 51-58, is attached 
as Addendum C. The Findings and Conclusions, R. 48-50, are 
attached as Addendum D. In a supplemental affidavit dated 
January 26, 1996, Taylor testified that u[t]he Findings and 
Decree are consistent in every respect with ... our agreed 
settlement of the matter." R. 29-31, %8 . Taylor's Supplemental 
Affidavit, R. 2 9-31, is attached as Addendum E. The Decree and 
the Findings and Conclusions were entered by the district court 
and filed on February 2, 1996. R. 48, 50, 51, 58. 
On May 29, 1996, Taylor's father, Keith E. Taylor of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, entered his appearance as Taylor's 
counsel of record. R. 63-64. Mr. Cowley and Ms. Martinson 
subsequently filed a Notice of Withdrawal as Taylor's counsel on 
June 18, 1996. R. 65-66. 
On August 1, 1996, Taylor filed a "Motion to Compel 
Defendant To Sign Trust Agreement Or, In The Alternative, To 
Amend The Judgment And Decree Of Divorce And For Certain Other 
Relief" ("Motion to Compel"). R. 69-71. The Motion to Compel 
sought an order: (1) requiring Hansen to execute a proposed 
"Trust; Agreement and Declaration of Trust" prepared by Taylor 
("Taylor's trust agreement") or, in the alternative, awarding 
-5-
Taylor 214,639 shares of stock which had been awarded to Hansen 
as Trustee for the parties' children under paragraph 12 of the 
Decree; (2) awarding Taylor judgment in the amount of $218.90 to 
reimburse a deduction Hansen made for Taylor's share of the 
children's health insurance premiums; (3) requiring Hansen to 
deliver support payments by first class mail rather than 
registered mail; and (4) awarding Taylor her costs and attorney 
fees related to the motion. R. 69-71. Taylor's trust agreement 
and affidavits of Taylor and her attorney were attached to the 
Motion to Compel. R. 72-94. Taylor's trust agreement, R. 73-77, 
is attached as Addendum F. 
Hansen filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion to 
Compel and submitted two exhibits: the Decree and the proposed 
trust agreement which Hansen had prepared and executed ("Hansen's 
trust agreement"). R. 107-28. Hansen's trust agreement, R. 123-
128, is attached as Addendum G. Hansen's memorandum asserted 
that the Motion to Compel was an improper attempt to modify the 
Decree without filing a petition to modify as required by Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 6-404(1); that Taylor's 
trust agreement did not conform to the Decree; that Hansen's 
trust agreement did conform to the Decree; that Hansen's $218.90 
deduction for Taylor's share of the children's health insurance 
premiums conformed to the Decree; that Taylor was not entitled to 
-6-
an award of her costs and attorney fees; and that Hansen should 
be awarded his costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In a Reply Memorandum filed 
August 23, 1996, Taylor argued that the relief she sought did not 
"constitute an ''amendment" of the Decree and withdrew her 
alternate prayer uto amend the Judgment and Decree of Divorce." 
R. 129-133. 
On September 1, 1996, Taylor filed another postjudgment 
motion seeking the entry of judgment in the amount of $202.50 for 
"delinquent child care costs," an order requiring Hansen to pay 
future child care costs within seven days after demand by Taylor, 
and an award of her costs and attorney fees ("Motion for 
Judgment"). R. 134-35. Hansen's memorandum in opposition to 
Taylor's Motion for Judgment explained that Taylor's demand for 
child care costs did not conform to the Decree or Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-45-7.16 (1995), and her request for costs and 
attorney fees should be denied. Hansen attached as exhibits to 
his memorandum an April 9, 1996 letter to Taylor's attorney 
requesting verification of her child care expenses and a copy of 
the demand Taylor had sent him. R. 145-63. Those documents, R. 
159-60 and 163, are attached as Addendum H. 
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The district court heard oral argument on both postjudgment 
motions on September 24, 1996, and took the matter under 
advisement. R. 164, 231-57. 
C. The District Court's Ruling. 
On October 29, 1996, the district court entered a 33 page 
Ruling denying both motions and awarding Hansen costs and 
attorney fees under Rule 11 "for having to employ counsel to 
respond to the improper and groundless trust issues in [Taylor's] 
Motion to Compel." R. 171-204, at 198, Addendum B. 
1. Findings of Fact. 
The Ruling contained 35 Findings of Fact on the substance of 
the final divorce documents and the pleadings, affidavits and 
exhibits relating to Taylor's motions. Ruling paras. 1-35, R. 
171-83, Addendum B. Findings 2 through 4 found that Taylor's 
attorney prepared the Decree and the Findings and Conclusions; 
that both parties and their attorneys stipulated in writing to 
all of the terms of those documents and their entry by the court; 
and that those documents were properly entered by the court and 
filed on February 2, 1996. Findings 5 through 8 quoted verbatim 
the specific provisions of those documents relating to Taylor's 
motions. Ruling paras. 2-8, R. 171-73, Addendum B. Findings 11 
through 18 described the relief sought by Taylor's Motion to 
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Compel, the pertinent provisions of Taylor's trust agreement, and 
the affidavits of Taylor and her attorney in support of the 
Motion to Compel. Ruling paras. 11-18, R. 173-77, Addendum B. 
Findings 19 through 25 summarized Hansen's memorandum in 
opposition to Taylor's Motion to Compel and Hansen's trust 
agreement. Ruling paras. 19-25, R. 177-79, Addendum B. Findings 
26 through 30 summarized Taylor's reply memorandum, which 
withdrew Taylor's request to xxamend the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce" and stated that if the district court did not grant the 
Motion to Compel, Taylor would file an appropriate new petition 
to modify the Decree. Ruling paras. 26-30, R. 179-80, Addendum 
B. 
Findings 31 through 34 summarized the pleadings and 
documents relating to Taylor's Motion for Judgment, Ruling paras. 
31-34, R. 180-81, Addendum B. Finding 32 found that Taylor's 
demand letter to Hansen's counsel uis mostly handwritten and 
contains no statements as to the identity of the child care 
provider except for that printed and stamped on one receipt dated 
July 9, 1996, with the caption 'tuition for July 10, 1996,' 
totaling $27.00." Ruling para. 32, R. 180, Addendum B. Finding 
35 summarized the oral argument presented at the September 24, 
1996 hearing concerning the Decree's distribution of stock to 
-9-
Hansen as Trustee for the parties' children. Ruling paras. 
35(a)-(h), R. 181-83, Addendum B. 
2. Conclusions of Law. 
a) Taylor's Trust Agreement• 
The district court concluded that Hansen would not be 
compelled to execute Taylor's trust agreement because it was 
contrary to the terms of the Decree. R. 183-93, Addendum B. The 
court held that the final divorce documents were a binding 
stipulation and interpreted those documents in accordance with 
the Utah law of contract interpretation. Id. at 184-85. 
The district court not only held that the stipulated divorce 
documents reflected an integration, but also reviewed the four 
disputed terms of Taylor's trust agreement and separately 
determined the "completeness" of the Decree on each term. R. 186-
93, Addendum B. The court concluded that the rights and powers 
Taylor sought were contrary to the unambiguous provisions of 
paragraph 12 of the Decree and should have been requested by a 
petition to modify or Rule 60(b) motion. Id., Addendum B. 
In addition, the district court concluded that Hansen's 
trust agreement conformed to the Decree. While not ordering 
Taylor to execute Hansen's trust agreement, the court directed 
the parties "to get together and execute a trust agreement that 
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comports with the provisions of the Decree, including extra 
language only as agreed upon by the parties." R* 196, Addendum 
B. 
b) Deduction For Taylor's Share Of The Children's 
Health Insurance Premiums. 
The district court also denied Taylor's Motion to Compel 
Hansen to reimburse $218.90 which he had deducted from a payment 
for her share of the children's health insurance premiums in 
accordance with paragraph 4(a) of the Decree. Ruling, R. 194, 
Addendum B; Decree, R. 52, Addendum C. Taylor claimed that 
because Hansen had not withdrawn the premiums on a monthly basis, 
he had waived his right to the deduction. R. 102-03. The 
district court concluded that Taylor had not proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Hansen had waived his right to 
the deducted insurance premiums, in view of the fact that Taylor 
knew Hansen could deduct one-half of the premiums, Hansen had had 
to wait several months for the insurer's calculation of the 
amount of the health insurance premiums attributable to the 
children, the Decree was silent as to any term regarding the time 
or method of the deduction and any term regarding waiver, Hansen 
had been current in his child support and alimony payments and 
was paying the children's health insurance, the deductions had 
only been delayed for a few months, and Taylor had enjoyed the 
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use of the extra money during that period. Ruling, R. 194-95, 
Addendum B. See also, R. 160, Addendum H. Concluding that 
Hansen was entitled to deduct the accumulated insurance premiums 
totaling $218.90 under paragraph 4(a) of the Decree, the district 
court denied Taylor's Motion to Compel on that point. Ruling, R. 
194-96, Addendum B. 
c) Payments By Mail. 
The district court found that the parties had reached 
agreement on Taylor's request that payments be sent to her by 
first class mail rather than registered mail and, therefore, did 
not address that issue in its Ruling. Ruling, R. 196, Addendum 
B. 
d) Taylor/s Request For Costs And Attorney Fees. 
The district court concluded that Taylor's request for costs 
and attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3 (1995 Replacement) 
had no merit and denied it. Ruling, R. 197-98, Addendum B. 
e) Award Of Costs And Attorney Fees To Hansen. 
The district court awarded Hansen the costs and attorney 
fees he incurred in responding to the trust agreement issues 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Ruling, R. 197-98, 
Addendum B. The court held that Rule 11 "requires some inquiry 
into both the facts and the law before [a pleading] is filed 
[and] the level of inquiry is tested against a standard of 
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reasonableness under the circumstances," Id. at 197. It 
concluded that Taylor had violated that standard: 
Here, the Court finds the circumstances remarkable and 
the behavior absolutely unreasonable. [Taylor] has 
seen fit to file with the Court this Motion to Compel, 
that, as set forth above, is wholly without any merit 
whatsoever in law or in fact. She has drawn up a trust 
agreement that completely ignores and deviates from the 
plain, unambiguous and clear language of the stipulated 
Decree, alleging that the trust agreement should be in 
accord with "the intentions" of the parties rather than 
the language of the stipulated Decree, bringing up 
marital property issues that for all legal purposes 
were completely disposed of by the Decree; citing no 
relevant evidence to these allegedly contrary 
intentions; pled that [Hansen] has refused to sign this 
improper agreement; and when her attempts to do so 
didn't work, attempted to couch an obvious petition to 
modify, or even a Rule 60(b) motion, as a Motion to 
Compel. Furthermore, it appears that [Taylor] has 
completely disregarded the case law on the binding 
nature of stipulations. There is no merit to 
[Taylor's] request for attorneys' fees, and her request 
for such is hereby denied. Conversely, [Taylor] has so 
completely failed to comply with Rule 11 that the Court 
feels an appropriate sanction should be an award to 
[Hansen] of his attorneys' fees and costs for having to 
employ counsel to respond to the improper and 
groundless trust issues in [Taylor's] Motion to Compel. 
As requested both in his memorandum in support and at 
oral arguments, the Court will award to [Hansen] 
attorneys' fees and costs for any work performed 
responding, either by pleading, letter, telephone, or 
in Court, to the trust agreement issues raised by 
[Taylor's] Motion to Compel. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Ruling, R. 197-98, Addendum B. 
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f) Taylor's Motion For Judgment, 
The district court also concluded that Taylor was not 
entitled to the payment for alleged child care expenses sought in 
her Motion for Judgment. The court found that Hansen had agreed 
to pay child care costs when Taylor supplied verification, and 
that in April of 1996, Hansen's counsel had sent Taylor's counsel 
a letter requesting specific information about Taylor's 
employment or school schedule, a statement indicating that the 
receipts were for child care expenses while Taylor was at work or 
school, and receipts identifying the dates and name, address and 
telephone number of the child care provider. R. 16 0, Addendum H. 
The court examined Taylor's claim and described it as "an invoice 
of sorts appearing to be a photocopied collage of various pieces 
of information." Ruling, R. 199, Addendum B. It found that 
after Hansen received the "photocopied collage" he sent Taylor a 
letter again requesting the information his attorney had 
requested in April. Id. 
Paragraph 4(c) of the Decree stated that "[Hansen] shall, 
per the applicable statutes, reimburse [Taylor] for one-half of 
any child care costs and/or expenses incurred by [Taylor] as a 
result of *her career and/or occupational training and/or 
employment." Decree, R. 52, Addendum C. Based upon the specific 
statutory provisions requiring a parent who incurs child care 
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expenses to provide written verification of the cost and identity 
of the child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement, and thereafter on the request of the other parent, 
the district court ruled that Taylor had not complied with the 
Decree "per the applicable statutes." Ruling, R. 200, Addendum 
B; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-7.16 and -7.17. It ruled that Taylor 
should provide Hansen with copies of actual receipts originating 
from the daycare provider detailing the dates and times that 
child care expenses were incurred, verification of Taylor's work 
or study schedule originating from a third party (such as a copy 
of the class schedules for schooling attended by Taylor), and a 
simple handwritten note signed by Taylor stating that the 
receipts were for child care expenses while Taylor was employed 
or in school. Ruling, R. 200-02, Addendum B. In denying 
Taylor's motion for judgment for child care costs, the district 
court emphasized that its Ruling did not preclude Taylor from 
filing a future motion for the same or similar relief if she 
complied with the guidelines set forth in the Ruling. Ruling, R, 
202, Addendum B. The district court also denied Taylor's request 
for costs and attorney fees in relation to the Motion for 
Judgment. Id. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appeal should be dismissed because the Ruling is not a 
final order under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1997). 
Furthermore, the district court correctly denied Taylor's 
postjudgment motions because the relief they sought was directly 
contrary to the clear and unambiguous provisions of the 
stipulated Decree. The district court's comparison of Taylor's 
motions to the plain language of the Decree revealed that the 
motions were an obvious attempt to modify or amend the Decree 
without filing a petition to modify or motion to amend as Utah 
law requires. Thus, Taylor did not properly invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court in the first place or this 
Court on appeal, and was not entitled to any of the relief sought 
in her Motion to Compel and Motion for Judgment. 
Paragraph 12 of the stipulated Decree clearly provided that 
214,63 9 shares of stock be distributed to Hansen as Trustee for 
the parties' children, that the trust agreement include the 
normal and usual provisions with respect to investing and 
preserving the assets for the use and benefit of the children, 
and that in the event of Hansen's death Zions Bank would become 
the substitute trustee. It did not give Taylor any rights or 
powers over the trust assets or income except the right to an 
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annual accounting, and it pointedly did not treat the shares . 
distributed to Hansen in his capacity as Trustee as marital 
property. Decree para. 12, R. 57-58, Addendum C. Under the 
controlling Utah case law, the district court correctly concluded 
that Taylor's motion to compel the execution of Taylor's trust 
agreement giving her substantial rights and powers over the trust 
assets and income was completely without merit. Taylor's motions 
for payments for reimbursement of the children's health insurance 
I 
premiums and unverified child care expenses were also contrary to 
the provisions of the stipulated Decree, and were properly denied 
by th§ trial court. I 
The lower court's conclusion that Taylor violated Rule 11 is 
amply supported by the record. Its award of the costs and 
I 
attorney fees Hansen incurred in responding to Taylor's meritless 
claims concerning the trust should be affirmed. In addition, 
Hansen should be awarded damages, including double costs and his 
reasonable attorney fees, on appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 33(a). 
i 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Appeal Should Be Dismissed For Lack Of Jurisdiction. 
The appeal should be dismissed because the Ruling is not a 
i 
final order under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Under 
the final judgment rule which underlies Rule 3, a party is 
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precluded from appealing any order or judgment that is not final. 
Burton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1994); A.J. 
Mackay Co. v. Okland Construction Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 
1991). Since there is no appellate jurisdiction to review a non-
final order, such an appeal must be dismissed. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 101 S. Ct. 669, 676 
(1981); A.J. Mackay Co., 817 P.2d at 325; Thompson v. Jackson, 
743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
It is well-established that a postjudgment ruling in a 
divorce proceeding which leaves a matter in controversy open for 
future determination is not a final, appealable order. Indeed, 
the policy prohibiting piecemeal interlocutory appeals of non-
final orders is especially important in divorce cases, where 
contentious parties could bring repeated postjudgment motions and 
appeals for years after the divorce was settled. Pearson v. 
Pearson, 641 P.2d 103, 104-05 (Utah 1982). See also, Van Wagenen 
v. Walker, 597 P 2d 1327, 1328 (Utah 1979); Kennedy v. New Era 
Indus. Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979). 
In this case, the district court's Ruling clearly left the 
matters raised by Taylor's motions open for future determination. 
The lower court held that both motions improperly sought to 
modify or amend the Decree without filing a petition to modify 
pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 6-404-(1) , 
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or a motion to amend pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(bh, and invited further proceedings to implement or modify the 
Decree. Ruling, R. 189 n.3, 196, 202, Addendum B. 
The district court's Ruling expressly directed the parties 
to u . . . get together and execute a trust agreement that comports 
with the provisions of the Decree, including extra language only 
as agreed upon by the parties." Ruling, R. 196, Addendum B. It 
also emphasized that its denial of Taylor's Motion for Judgment 
"in no means precludes [Taylor] from filing a future motion for 
the same or similar relief if she complies with the guidelines 
set forth [in the Ruling] and [Hansen] nevertheless continues to 
refuse to remit his portions of the child care costs." Ruling, 
R. 202, Addendum B. Thus, the Ruling on its face was not a final 
order under Rule 3. Pearson, 641 P.2d at 104; Van Wagenen, 597 
P.2d at 1328. 
Moreover, Taylor represented to the district court in her 
Reply Memorandum and at oral argument that if the court did not 
grant her Motion to Compel, she would file a petition to modify 
the Decree. R. 131, 179-80, Addendum B; R. 236-37. The 
representation Taylor's attorney made to the district court at 
the hearing clearly reflects the non-final nature of the 
proceeding below: 
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Mr. Taylor: Now [Hansen's attorney], in her 
responsive pleadings, invited my 
attention to the fact that we're not in 
the right procedural posture to do that 
at this hearing. And so in my response, 
I withdrew that alternate prayer for 
relief indicating to the Court that if 
for any reason, Your Honor, things were 
premature or for any reason you decide 
that that issue ought not to be resolved 
at this time, we will comply with Rule 4, 
we will set an evidentiary hearing in 
this court .... 
R. 236-37. Contrary to that representation, Taylor purported to 
appeal the interlocutory Ruling without further procedures in the 
lower court. 
Three avenues exist for securing review of a non-final 
order: (1) a petition to grant an interlocutory appeal from the 
order pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 5; (2) a motion for 
certification of the order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b); and 
(3) a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65B(e). Taylor did not pursue any of those alternative 
avenues to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over a 
non-final order. Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed. 
Tyler v. Dep't. of Human Services, 874 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1994); 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539-40 (Utah 1979); 
Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 
1979) . 
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B. The District Court Correctly Denied Taylor's Motions For 
Relief Contrary To The Stipulated Judgment And Decree Of 
Divorce. 
1. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Grant The 
Relief Sought By Taylor's Motions. 
The district court concluded correctly that Taylor's Motion 
to Compel "attempted to couch an obvious petition to modify or 
even a Rule 60(b) motion, as a Motion to Compel.'7 Ruling, R. 
198, Addendum B. While the court did not attempt to discern the 
reasons for Taylor's improper filing, it noted that "it appears 
that a Rule 60 motion would not be timely, further it appears 
dubious on the facts presented that [Taylor] would succeed in a 
petition to modify." Ruling, R. 198 n.7, Addendum B. Taylor's 
Motion for Judgment similarly attempted to mask a petition for 
relief contrary to the Decree as a motion to enforce the Decree. 
See Section B-4 infra. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-404(1) requires 
that proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by 
the filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce 
action, and not by way of an order to show cause. A divorce 
decree may also be amended pursuant to a timely motion under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have consistently enforced those Rules, holding that a 
district court lacks jurisdiction to amend a divorce decree 
-21-
except as provided by U. C. J. Ad. Rule 6-404 and Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 60(b). Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976); 
Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 710-11 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief 
sought by Taylor's motions. 
2. The District Court Correctly Denied Taylor's Motion 
To Compel Hansen To Execute Taylor's Trust 
Agreement. 
There is no error in the district court's carefully reasoned 
decision that Taylor's trust agreement did not conform to the 
stipulated Decree. The district court simply read the plain 
language of paragraph 12 of the Decree, which distributed shares 
of stock in Cambric Graphics, Inc. to Hansen as Trustee for the 
parties' children, and determined that Taylor's trust agreement 
did not comport with its terms. Ruling, R. 185-93, Addendum B. 
a) The Enforceability Of The Stipulated Decree. 
Taylor's argument that paragraph 12 of the Decree is 
unenforceable because it is "an agreement to agree" is improperly 
raised for the first time on appeal. In the district court 
proceedings, Taylor did not dispute that the stipulated divorce 
documents drafted by her attorney constitute a binding 
stipulation. To the contrary, she argued that her Motion to 
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Compel was brought to enforce the parties' binding stipulation. 
R. 131, 236-37. Consequently, she cannot attack the stipulation 
on appeal. Le Baron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, 
Inc., 823 P.2d 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Broberg v. Hess, 782 
P.2d 198 (Utah 1989) . 
Taylor's attack on the enforceability of the stipulated 
Decree is also contrary to Utah law. Settlement agreements are 
enforceable in Utah, even when the parties have not signed any 
written stipulation or agreement. U. C. J. Ad. Rule 4-504(8); 
John Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 
581 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). A property distribution in a 
stipulated divorce decree is not only binding, but cannot be 
modified without a demonstration of compelling reasons. Foulger 
v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 
796 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 
P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, divorce decrees 
commonly require the execution of documents and performance of 
actions after the decree becomes final. See, e.g., Maxwell, 796 
P.2d at 4 07 (decree requiring subsequent transfer of retirement 
benefits). 
The Colorado case relied upon by Taylor is completely 
inapposite. A Colorado court's determination of child custody 
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issues under a Colorado statute does not affect the 
enforceability of a stipulated property division under Utah law. 
See, Griffin v. Griffin, 699 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1985). Moreover, 
Taylor's citation of outdated cases and continuing disregard of 
the clear record and Utah case law establishing the 
enforceability of the stipulated Decree illustrates the frivolous 
nature of her appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 36 (citing 
Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944 (Utah 1953); Openshaw v. 
Openshaw, 126 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1942); and Klein v. Klein 
(erroneous citation in Brief of Appellant). 
b) The District Court's Interpretation Of The 
Stipulated Decree. 
Under Utah law, a stipulated divorce decree is construed in 
accordance with the Utah rules of contract interpretation. 
Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60. The district court correctly applied 
the Utah law of contract interpretation in concluding that the 
intent of the parties must be determined first from the Decree 
itself. Ruling, R. 184, Addendum B. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. 
v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). 
When the meaning of the decree is clear and unambiguous, as 
it was in this case, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to 
explain the intent of the parties and the court may determine its 
meaning as a matter of law. Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770; 
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Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60; Nielson, 886 P.2d at 63-64. A decree 
is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, 
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. Willard Pease, 899 
P_2d at 770. The mere fact that the parties interpret the 
language differently does not make it ambiguous. R. 184, 
Addendum B. Pease at 772; Nielson, 886 P.2d at 63-64; 
Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60. 
Nor did the district court err in applying the parol 
evidence rule. R. 184-85, Addendum B. It correctly applied that 
rule to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations or statements offered for the purpose of varying 
or adding to the terms of an integrated writing. Hall v. Process 
Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995); 
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Before considering the applicability of the parol evidence rule, 
the court first determined that the parties intended the writing 
to be an integration. Hall at 1026 (citing Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)). Because the writing was 
integrated, parol evidence was not admissible to vary or 
contradict unambiguous terms. Ruling, R. 185, Addendum B. Hall 
at 1026-27 (citing Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 
731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)). 
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The district court properly applied the controlling Utah 
case law in determining that the stipulated Decree was 
integrated. It followed the Utah supreme court's 1995 decision 
in Hall-, which defined an integrated agreement as a "writing or 
writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of 
an agreement." Hall 890 P. 2d at 1026-27 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
J SECOND )„ OF. CONTRACTS § 209 (1981)). Ruling, R. 186, Addendum B. 
Under Hall, "an apparently complete and certain agreement which 
the parties have reduced to writing will be conclusively presumed 
to contain the whole agreement." Hall at 1026 (quoting EIE v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981)). 
The trial court's conclusion that the Decree was integrated 
was based first upon the plain language of the Decree and the 
stipulated Finding that u [a]11 matters relating to child custody, 
property division, and alimony have been agreed to by the parties 
and are set forth in detail in the [Decree]...." Finding No. 7, 
R. 49, Addendum D. In addition, the district court separately 
examined each of the four terms raised by Taylor and concluded 
that the Decree was integrated as to each of those terms. Hall, 
at 1026-1027. 
First, Taylor sought control or oversight of the trust 
assets, even though paragraph 12 of the Decree called for "normal 
and usual provisions with respect to investing and preserving the 
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assets and income of the trust." The trial court concluded that 
since those "normal and usual" provisions were described in Utah 
Code Annotated § 75-7-402, the term of the Decree relating to 
trustee powers was complete and integrated. R. 188, Addendum B. 
The trial court found that term unambiguous and, in any event, 
Taylor had not presented any evidence that would clarify any 
alleged ambiguity about Taylor's claim to final decision making 
power over the disposition of trust assets. Ruling, R. 188-89, 
Addendum B. Concluding that the term was integrated and 
unambiguous and there were no provisions in paragraph 12 or 
anywhere else in the Decree that would give Taylor the powers she 
sought, the district court denied the Motion to Compel as to that 
term. In doing so, the court stressed that if Taylor sought 
decision making power over trust assets based on newly discovered 
conduct by Hansen, the court could not grant her motion because 
there was no mention of any such concerns in any of the divorce 
pleadings and her request was more properly the subject of a 
petition to modify or Rule 60(b) motion. Ruling, R. 188-89 and 
n.3, Addendum B. 
Second, Taylor sought a remainder interest in the event of 
the death of both children, even though paragraph 12 of the 
Decree provided that only the children would hold beneficial 
interests in the trust assets and did not provide for Taylor to 
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have any interest at all. The district court read paragraph 12 ' 
as clearly and unambiguously indicating that the trust was 
intended solely to benefit the children and the trust corpus was 
to be distributed exclusively to them. Ruling, R. 190, Addendum 
B. It reasoned that if the parties had agreed that Taylor would 
have any interest in the trust assets, that agreement would have 
been included in the Decree, and it was not. Accordingly, it 
denied Taylor's motion for a remainder interest in the trust. 
Ruling, R. 190-91, Addendum B. In doing so, the trial court 
emphasized that Taylor's claim to a remainder interest would be 
more properly asserted in a petition to modify or Rule 60(b) 
motion rather than a motion to compel Hansen to sign a trust 
agreement inconsistent with the terms of the Decree. R. 190-91, 
Addendum B. 
Third, Taylor sought to be appointed substitute trustee in 
the event Hansen died or was otherwise unable to serve, even 
though paragraph 12 of the Decree plainly mandated that Zions 
Bank and Trust be the substitute trustee. The district court 
concluded that this request was so diametrically opposed to the 
express term of the Decree "that any argument that the terms are 
in accord must simply be dismissed as nonsensical." Ruling, R. 
191, Addendum B. It held that paragraph 12 of the Decree was 
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clear, unambiguous, and an integrated expression of the parties' 
intentions as to the substitute trustee, that no evidence as to 
the parties' intentions on that point had been presented by 
either party, and that to compel Hansen to execute a trust 
agreement naming Taylor as substitute trustee would be contrary 
to the express language of the Decree. Ruling, R. 191-92, 
Addendum B. 
Fourth, Taylor's trust agreement required that u[c] ash 
dividends shall be immediately paid and distributed to the 
custodial parent or guardian" of the children, even though Hansen 
had already agreed in the stipulated Decree to pay Taylor both 
child support and alimony. Ruling, R. 192, Addendum B. The 
Decree only provided for disbursements for the benefit of the 
I 
children, and was silent as to the disposition of cash dividends. 
Ruling, R. 192, Addendum B. The court concluded that no evidence 
had been presented that would entitle Taylor to cash dividends 
from the trust assets, and the court would not compel Hansen to 
sign a trust agreement that included terms not contemplated by 
the Decree. R. 193, Addendum B. 
c) The District Court's Refusal To Admit Parol 
Evidence To Vary The Terms Of the Stipulated 
Decree. 
Taylor challenges Finding of Fact No. 35, which described 
the oral argument concerning Taylor's motion to compel Hansen to 
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execute Taylor's trust agreement. Taylor has failed, however, to 
marshall the evidence in support of that Finding or to 
demonstrate that it is clearly erroneous. See Willard Pease, 899 
P.2d at 773. The case on which Taylor relies in challenging the 
Finding, Donahue v. Intermountain Health Care, 748 P.2d 1067 
(Utah 1987), has no bearing on this appeal. That decision merely 
affirmed a trial court's exercise of discretion in granting a new 
trial based upon an improper closing argument to a jury. 
The district court correctly rejected Taylor's argument that 
the "evidence" she submitted in affidavits and argument should be 
"accepted as uncontroverted." The court noted that Hansen, in 
his memorandum in opposition, "set forth the terms of the 
stipulated Decree that specifically rebut every one of [Taylor's] 
allegations as to the trust agreement." Ruling, R. 185 n.2, 
Addendum B. As the district court found, "[t]his, in itself, is 
the best evidence of the parties' intentions as to the trust 
agreement" and the remainder of Taylor's "uncontroverted facts" 
did not need to be controverted because they were not properly 
before the court on a petition to modify or Rule 60(b) motion. 
Id. 
The parol evidence proffered by Taylor was inadmissible in 
any event, because the Decree contained no ambiguity that could 
support a reasonable conclusion that Taylor had any rights or 
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powers over the trust assets and income except the right to an 
annual accounting. Taylor clearly proffered her parol "evidence" 
to vary and contradict the Decree rather than to clarify any 
ambiguity. Ruling, R. 189-193. Hall, at 1026; Whitehouse, 790 
P.2d at 60. Thus, Taylor argues that her parol evidence was 
admissible to prove that the shares of stock distributed to 
Hansen as Trustee for the children should be treated as marital -
property, when the Decree pointedly does not refer to those 
shares as marital property. Ruling, R. 191, Addendum B. Taylor 
argues that her parol evidence was admissible to restrict 
Hansen's powers as trustee, when the Decree expressly states that 
the trust agreement should contain the "normal and usual" 
provisions without any restrictions. Ruling R. 187-89, Addendum 
B. And Taylor argues that her parol evidence was admissible to 
prove her claim to rights and powers over trust assets and 
income, when the Decree clearly gives her no such rights or 
powers. Id. Thus, Taylor's arguments fly in the face of the 
Utah law of contract interpretation. The trial court's denial of 
Taylor's Motion to Compel the execution of Taylor's trust 
agreement was clearly correct. 
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3. The District Court Correctly Denied Taylor'& Motion 
To Compel Reimbursement Of The Deduction For The 
Children's Health Insurance Premiums. 
Although the Brief of Appellant contains no explanation of 
her appeal of the district court's denial of Taylor's claim for 
reimbursement, it purports to seek reversal on that issue. The 
motion for reimbursement was frivolous and the district court's 
denial was plainly correct. 
Paragraph 4(a) of the Decree provided that: 
For so long as [Hansen] has available to him through 
his place of employment health and accident insurance 
coverage, he shall maintain said insurance and such 
coverage for the children and shall pay the premiums 
therefor and may deduct from the child support one-half 
of the cost incurred to keep the children so insured. 
R. 52, 172, Addendums C, B. 
Hansen indisputedly maintained the children's health 
insurance, paid the premiums, and deducted $218.90 from a payment 
to Taylor in June 1996 for one-half of the premiums he had paid 
for the children since the entry of the Decree. Hansen explained 
that he did not know the amount of the premiums attributable to 
the children until he received a calculation from the insurer. 
Ruling, R. 194-95, Addendum B, See R. 160, Addendum H. Taylor 
did not dispute the correctness of the amount or the fact that 
Hansen did not receive the insurer's calculation for several 
months. Yet, she moved to compel Hansen to reimburse the $218.90 
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deduction on the ground that he had waived the right to deduct 
that amount by not taking monthly deductions. R. 70. 
The district court correctly applied the Utah case law, 
which defines a waiver as the "intentional relinquishment of a 
known right," and requires an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and a distinct intention 
to relinquish it for a finding of waiver. Soter's v. Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). Ruling, 
R. 194, Addendum B. The court's conclusion that Taylor had "not 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [Hansen] waived 
his right to the belatedly deducted insurance premium" is subject 
to review under the abuse of discretion standard. Judge Norman 
H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 7 Utah B.J. 25-26 
(1994). Under that standard, the court's conclusion clearly must 
be affirmed. Soter's, 857 P.2d at 940; R. 195, Addendum B. 
4. The District Court Correctly Denied Taylor's Motion 
For Judgment For Child Care Payments Without The 
Verification Required By The Decree And Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-45-7.16. 
Paragraph 4(c) of the Decree provided: 
[Hansen] shall, per the applicable statutes, reimburse 
[Taylor] for one-half of any child care costs and/or 
expenses incurred by [Taylor] as a result of her career 
and/or occupational training and/or employment. 
Decree para. 4(c), R. 52, Addendum C. The applicable statutes 
are Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-45-7.16 and 78-45-7.17(2)(1995). 
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Because Taylor had agreed to forward receipts for future claims, 
the only issue before the trial court was whether Taylor's 
previous claim for $202.50 met the standards defined by paragraph 
4(c) of the Decree and the applicable statutes. Ruling, R. 200, 
Addendum B. 
Under Section 78-45-7.16, a parent is required to pay his 
share of child care expenses "upon presentation of proof of the 
child care expense," and the parent who incurs child care 
expenses is required to "provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of the child care provider to the other parent upon 
initial engagement and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16(2) (a), -(2) (b) (i) . Section 
78-45-7.17 states that the inclusion of child care costs "is not 
presumed but may be awarded on a case-by-case basis, if the costs 
are related to the career or occupational training of the 
custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the 
interest of justice." The district court determined that the 
"photocopied collage" that Taylor had sent to Hansen did not meet 
those standards, and therefore denied Taylor's Motion for 
Judgment. 
The district court's denial of the Motion for Judgment for 
unverified child care costs must be affirmed as correct. The 
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factual allegations in the Brief of Appellee are not reflected in 
the documents which Taylor provided to Hansen or the district 
court; their inclusion in Taylor's Brief only illustrates the 
insufficiency of the documents she did provide. Compare R. 163, 
Addendum H, to Brief of Appellant at 27-30. The documents which 
Taylor's attorney handed to Hansen's attorney at the September 
24, 1996 hearing were obviously untimely, but were nevertheless 
considered by the district court and found wanting. Ruling, R. 
202, Addendum B. The trial court's Findings of Fact concerning 
Taylor's "photocopied collage" are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review, and certainly meet that standard. 
Peterson, 818 P.2d at 1307-08. 
5. The District Court Correctly Denied Taylor18 
Requests For Other Relief. 
There was no reason for the district court to enter an order 
that Hansen deliver his alimony and child support payments to 
Taylor by first class mail instead of registered mail. The 
Decree required the payments to be made by check or other 
instrument, but did not specify any method of delivery. Decree 
R. 52-54, Addendum C. In response to the Motion to Compel, 
Hansen agreed to deliver future payments by first class mail. R. 
110, see Ruling, R. 178, Addendum B. At the September 24, 1996 
hearing, Taylor's attorney admitted the issue was moot. R. 238. 
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Under these circumstances, the district court was not obliged to 
enter any order. The Brief of Appellant challenges the district 
court's Findings of Fact on this subject, but fails to marshall 
the evidence or demonstrate that those Findings are clearly 
erroneous. See Ruling paras. 16(b) and 23, R. 176 and 178, 
Addendum B; Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d at 13 07 (clearly 
erroneous standard of review); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 
838 (Utah 1991) (party seeking to overturn trial court's findings 
of fact has the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrating that despite such evidence, 
the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence, and therefore clearly erroneous). 
Nor was there any error in the district court's denial of 
Taylor's requests for costs and attorney fees under Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-3-3 (1997). The court's denial of fees under 
Section 30-3-3 is subject to review under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Peterson, 
818 P.2d at 1310. The denial of Taylor's request clearly meets 
that standard, since Section 30-3-3 gives the trial court broad 
discretion concerning the allowance of costs and attorney fees. 
The statute is intended to enable a party to prosecute or defend 
a divorce proceeding properly. Id. Since Taylor's motions were 
-36-
improperly filed and were denied in their entirety, she was not 
entitled to any award of costs or fees. 
C. The District Court's Award Of The Costs And Attorney 
Fees Hansen Incurred In Responding To The Trust 
Agreement Issues Raised By The Motion To Compel Should 
Be Affirmed. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides, in part, that: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law .... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court ... shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include ... a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Whether specific conduct violates Rule 11 is a question of 
law. Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (citing Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986)). In Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court 
affirmed a district court's conclusion that the filing of a 
petition to modify a divorce decree in Salt Lake County when the 
decree had been entered in Washington County constituted a 
violation of Rule 11. 
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In this case, the district court correctly concluded that 
Taylor's conduct violated Rule 11, which ''requires some inquiry 
into both the facts and the law before the paper is filed[,] with 
the level of inquiry tested against a standard of reasonableness 
under the circumstances." Ruling, R. 197, Addendum B. Taylor, 
770 P.2d at 171 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1333 at 177 (Supp. 1987)) Indeed, the 
trial court found "the circumstances remarkable, and the behavior 
absolutely unreasonable." Ruling, R. 197, Addendum B. It deemed 
Taylor's Motion to Compel to be "wholly without any merit 
whatsoever in law or in fact." Ruling, R. 197, Addendum B. It 
held that Taylor's trust agreement "completely ignores and 
deviates from the plain, unambiguous and clear language of the 
stipulated Decree; alleging that the trust agreement should be in 
accord with 'the intentions' of the parties rather than the 
language of the stipulated Decree; bringing up marital property 
issues that for all legal purposes were completely disposed of by 
the Decree; citing no relevant evidence to these allegedly 
contrary intentions; plead that [Hansen] has refused to sign this 
improper agreement; and when their attempts to do so didn't work, 
attempted to couch an obvious petition to modify, or even a Rule 
60(b) motion, as a Motion to Compel." Ruling, R. 197-98, 
Addendum B. The trial court observed that Taylor had "completely 
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disregarded the case law on the binding nature of stipulations." 
Ruling, R. 198, Addendum B. 
This Court has indicated that it will affirm the sanction 
imposed by the trial court, including the reasonableness of any 
fee award, absent an abuse of discretion. Taylor, 770 P.2d at 
171. In this case, the trial court determined that Taylor had 
"so completely failed to comply with Rule 11 that ... an 
appropriate sanction should be an award to [Hansen] of his 
attorneys' fees and costs for having to employ counsel to respond 
to the improper and groundless trust issues in [Taylor's] Motion 
to Compel." R. 198, Addendum B. Given the clear record of 
conduct violating Rule 11 in this case, the district court's 
sanction should be affirmed. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d at 711; 
Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171. See also, Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146 
(Utah 1991); Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Durbans Const. Co., Inv. , 
144 F.R.D. 402 (D. Utah 1992). Indeed, any other result would 
undermine the district court's ability to sanction improper 
litigation tactics in this and other divorce cases. 
In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, 
an award of attorney fees may be based solely upon the trial 
court's discretion. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 832 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Thus, even if Taylor's conduct had not 
-39-
constituted a violation of Rule 11, the district court would have 
had discretion to award fees and costs. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 
1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Lyngle, 831 P.2d at 1030. 
D. Hansen Is Entitled To Recover Twice His Costs And His 
Attorney Fees Incurred On Appeal Pursuant To Rule 33, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33 provides that"if the 
court determines that [an] appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs ... and/or reasonable attorney 
fees, to the prevailing party." Utah R. App. P. 33(a) (1997) . 
The Court may order the party or the party's attorney to pay the 
damages. Id. An appeal is "frivolous" if it is "not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. 
App. P. 33(b). An appeal is "for delay" if it is "interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase 
in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal ...." Id. Double costs arid attorney 
fees are awarded on appeal when the totality of an appellant's 
argument causes the court to believe the appeal was frivolous. 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien 
v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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The general rule is that when a party who received attorney 
fees in the lower court prevails on appeal, the party is also 
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. Hill v. Hill, 
869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Lyngle, 831 P.2d at 1031; 
Utah Dep't of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing extensive authority). In addition, the 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 33 expressly states that where 
the trial court awarded damages under Rule 11, it is proper for 
this Court to award damages under Rule 33. Utah R. App. P. 33; 
Advisory Committee Note. 
This appeal is plainly not grounded in fact, warranted by 
existing law, or based on good faith. Rather than comply with 
the district court's suggestions to implement the Decree or 
follow the proper procedure for seeking its modification, Taylor 
has purported to appeal a non-final order that is firmly grounded 
on the plain language of the stipulated Decree, the record, and 
the controlling Utah statutes and case law. The appeal is 
"readily recognizable as devoid of merit," as it presents no 
justiciable question to this Court and is patently unlikely to 
succeed. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990). Indeed, 
Taylor's arguments on appeal usimply controvert the findings of 
the [trial] court." Consequently, the appeal is frivolous. 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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Moreover, the appeal appears calculated to harass Hansen or 
cause him needless litigation costs. Taylor made no effort to 
comply with the district court's suggestions to implement the 
Decree, nor did she pay Hansen the costs and attorney fees he 
incurred in responding to her motions. Instead, she subjected 
him to additional costs and attorney fees by filing a meritless 
appeal of a non-final order. 
The fact that Taylor's father is a senior partner in a major 
law firm renders the award of costs and attorney fees to Hansen 
especially appropriate. It is unlikely that Taylor actually paid 
any costs or fees in connection with her postjudgment motions. 
She should not be allowed to enjoy the properly awarded to her, 
monthly alimony and child support payments, and other benefits of 
the parties' settlement and, at the same time, burden her former 
husband with the expense of responding to frivolous motions and 
appeals pursued at little or no cost to her. See Eames, 735 P.2d 
at 397-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Even if Taylor's counsel 
pursued this appeal out of zealous parental concern, an award of 
double costs and attorney fees would be appropriate. Hunt v. 
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990) (awarding double costs plus 
attorney fees to appellee despite the possibility that counsel 
took the appeal as ua favor for a distressed friend"). 
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Taylor and her attorney have wasted this court's resources 
and Hansen's resources with a frivolous appeal. Under these 
circumstances, Rule 33 requires that Hansen be awarded damages. 
Utah R. App. P. 33(a) (1997) (See also, Rule 33 Advisory Committee 
Note stating, wIf an appeal is frivolous, the court must award 
damages"). Hansen therefore requests that this Court award 
double his costs and his reasonable attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Marc R. Hansen 
respectfully urges this Court 
A. To dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or, in 
the alternative, affirm the district court's Ruling in 
all respects; and 
B. To award Hansen twice his costs and his attorney fees 
incurred on appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 33. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 1997. 
O'RORKE Sc GARDINER, LLC 
Patricia A. O'Rorke 
Attorneys for Appellee-Defendant 
Marc Richard Hansen 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE was delivered by hand on the 18th day of 
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201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
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O'RORKE & GARDINER, LLC 
Patricia A. O'Rorke 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right; how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
appeal may be taken from a district . . . court to the appellate 
court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments.... 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of 
attorney's fees, 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based 
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such 
as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, 
or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11: Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other 
paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the 
attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented 
by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, 
written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, 
filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are 
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on 
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) 
has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, 
law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are 
responsible for the violation. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction 
imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to 
what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct 
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. 
Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) , the sanction may consist of, or include, 
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and 
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing 
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct 
result of the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against 
a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b) 
(2) . 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall 
describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this 
rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 6 - 4 0 4 . M o d i f i c a t i o n of Divorce d e c r e e s . 
I n t e n t : 
To establish procedures for modification of existing divorce 
decrees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be 
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the original 
divorce action. Service of the petition and summons upon the 
opposing party shall be in accordance with the requirements of 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a 
modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an 
order to show cause. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
75-7-401. Powers of trustee conferred by trust or by law. 
The trustee has all powers conferred upon him by the 
provisions of this part unless limited in the trust instrument 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
75-7-402 Powers of trustees conferred by this part. 
(1) From time of creation of the trust until final 
distribution of the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power 
to perform, without court authorization every act which a prudent 
man would perform for the purposes of the trust, including the 
powers specified in Subsection (3). 
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the powers 
granted by this part, a trustee has a duty to act with due regard 
to his obligation as a fiduciary, according to the standard set 
forth in Section 75-7-302. 
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to Subsections (1) and 
(2) to: 
(a) collect, hold, and retain trust assets received 
from a trustor until, in the judgment of the trustee, 
disposition of the assets should be made. The assets 
may be retained even though they include an asset in 
which the trustee is personally interested; 
(b) receive additions to the assets of the trust; 
(c) continue or participate in the operation of any 
business or other enterprise and effect incorporation, 
dissolution, or other change in the form of the 
organization of the business or enterprise; 
(d) acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in 
which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an 
undivided interest; 
(e) invest and reinvest trust assets in bonds, notes, 
stocks or corporations regardless of class, real estate 
or any interest in real estate, interests in trusts or 
in any other property, or individual interests in 
property wherever it is located; 
(f) invest and reinvest trust assets in securities of 
an open-end or closed-end type management investment 
company or investment trust which is registered under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, 
including securities of any investment company or 
investment trust that is affiliated with or a subsidiary 
of the trustee, or to which the trustee or its affiliate 
or subsidiary provides a service such as that of an 
investment advisor, custodian, transfer agent, 
registrar, sponsor, distributor, manager, or otherwise, 
for which it receives reasonable remuneration for such 
service; 
(g) deposit or invest trust funds in a bank, 
including a bank operated by the trustee; 
(h) (i) acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or 
on credit, at public or private sale; 
(ii) manage, develop, improve, exchange, 
partition, change the character of, or abandon a 
trust asset or any interest therein; and 
(iii) encumber, mortgage, or pledge a trust, in 
connection with the exercise of any power vested 
in the trustee; 
(i) make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or 
alterations in buildings or other structures, or 
demolish any improvements, raze existing or erect new 
party walls or buildings; 
(j) (i) subdivide, develop, improve, exchange, 
partition, change the character of, or abandon a 
trust asset or any interest therein; and 
(ii) make or obtain the vacation of plats and 
adjust boundaries; 
(iii) adjust differences in valuation on 
exchange or partition by giving or receiving 
consideration; or 
(iv) dedicate easements to public use without 
consideration; 
(k) enter, for any purpose into a lease as lessor or 
lessee with or without an option to purchase or renew 
for a term within or extending beyond the term or the 
trust; 
(1) enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration 
and removal or minerals or other natural resources or 
enter into a pooling or unitization agreement; 
(m) grant an option involving disposition of a trust 
asset, or take an option for the acquisition of any 
asset; 
(n) vote a security, in person or by general or 
limited proxy; 
(o) pay calls, assessments, and any other sums 
chargeable or accruing against or on account of 
securities. 
(p) sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion 
rights, consent, directly or through a committee or 
other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, 
merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation or 
other business enterprise; 
(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or in 
other form without disclosure of the trust so that 
title to the property may pass by delivery, but the 
trustee is liable for any act of the nominee in 
connection with the property so held; 
(r) insure the assets of the trust against damage or 
loss and the trustee against liability with respect to 
third persons; 
(s) (i) borrow money to be repaid from trust 
assets or otherwise; 
(ii) advance money to be repaid from trust 
assets or otherwise; or 
(iii) advance money for the protection of the 
trust, and for all expenses, losses, and 
liabilities sustained in the administration of 
the trust or because of the holding or ownership 
of any trust assets, for which advances with any 
interest the trustee has a lien on the trust 
assets as against the beneficiary; 
(t) (i) pay or contest any claim; 
(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by 
compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and 
(iii) release, in whole or in part, any claim 
belonging to the trust to the extent that the 
claim is uncollectible; 
(u) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the 
trustee, and other expenses incurred in the collection, 
care, administration, and protection of the trust; 
(v) allocate items of income or expense to either 
trust income or principal, as provided by law, including 
creation of reserves out of income for depreciation, 
obsolescence, amortization, or for depletion in mineral 
or timber properties; 
(w) notwithstanding the provisions of Section 75-5-
102, pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary under 
legal disability without liability to the trustee, by 
paying the sum to the beneficiary or by paying the sum 
for the use of the beneficiary either to a legal 
representative appointed by the court, or if none, to a 
relative; 
(x) effect distribution of property and money in 
divided or undivided interests and adjust resulting 
differences in valuation; 
(y) (i) employ persons, including attorneys, 
auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if 
they are associated with the trustee, to advise 
or assist the trustee in the performance of his 
administrative duties; 
(ii) act without independent investigation 
upon their recommendations; and 
(iii) instead of acting personally, employ one 
or more agents to perform any act of 
administration, whether or not discretionary; 
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or 
proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of 
the trustee in the performance of his duties; and 
(aa) execute and deliver all instruments which will 
accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the powers 
vested in the trustee. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses - Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent 
share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses of 
the parents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a 
parent shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis 
immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care 
expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be 
incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of 
that expense while it is not being incurred, without 
obtaining a modification of the child support order. 
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, 
a parent who incurs child care expense shall provide 
written verification of the cost and identity of a 
child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the 
request of the other parent. 
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, 
the parent shall notify the other parent of any 
change of child care provider or the monthly expense 
of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of 
the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, 
a parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right 
to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the 
expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-45-7.17 Child care costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed but 
may be awarded on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related 
to the career or occupational training of the custodial parent, 
or if otherwise ordered by the court in the interest of justice. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT : 0 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANE ANN TAYLOR, 
v. 
MARC RICHARD HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON: (1) PLAINTIFFS ^ 
MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT 
TO SIGN TRUST AGREEMENT AND 
FOR CERTAIN OTHER RELIEF; AND 
(2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT FOR DELINQUENT 
CHILD CARE COSTS AND FOR 
OTHER RELIEF 
Case No. 960700+&$ • 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Court on Tuesday, 
September 24, 1996. Petitioner, Jane Ann Taylor ("Petitioner"), was present and represented by 
Keith E. Taylor, Respondent Marc Richard Hansen ("Respondent") was present and represented 
by Patricia A, O'Rorke. The Court, having examined the record, the memoranda of the parties, 
and having heard oral argument and testimony, hereby enters the following findings of fact and 
rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on or about August 8, 1995, Petitioner, then proceeding under her married 
name of Jane Ann Taylor Hansen, filed a complaint for divorce from Respondent in this court. 
2. That on February 1, 1996, Judge Pro Tempore David Dillon signed a "Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce" ("Decree") granting a divorce between Petitioner and Respondent, which 
document was prepared by Ms. Taylor's attorney at that time, James P. Cowley ("Mr. Cowley") 
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3.- That on February 1, 1996, Judge Pro Tempore David Dillon further signed a 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" ("Findings of Fact") which document was also 
prepared by Mr. Cowley. 
4. The both the Findings of Fact and the Decree (collectively, the "final divorce 
documents") were properly filed with this Court on February 2, 1996. 
5. That the final divorce documents were entered with the court for judgment on the 
pleadings, with all terms of both documents stipulated to in writing by both Respondent and 
Petitioner, and their respective attorneys, Mr. Cowley and Ms. O'Rorke, below sentences stating 
respectively: "The plaintiff and the defendant stipulate to the foregoing and move the Court for 
immediate entry of the foregoing Judgment and Decree of DivorceQ," and "The plaintiff and the 
defendant stipulate to the foregoing and move the Court for immediate entry of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
6. That paragraph no. 7 of the Findings of Fact states: 
All matters relating to child custody, child support, property division, and 
alimony have been agreed to by the parties and are set forth in detail in the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce submitted by the parties and entered 
contemporaneously herewith. The Court finds that the provisions agreed to by the 
parties as set forth in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce are in all respects fair, 
just, appropriate and equitable and the Court by this finding ratifies, confirms and 
approves the same. 
7. That paragraph no. 4, subparagraph a. of the Decree states: 
For so long as the defendant has available to him through his place of 
employment health and accident insurance coverage, he shall maintain said 
insurance and such coverage for the children and shall pay the premiums therefor 
and may deduct from the child support one-half of the cost incurred to keep the 
children so insured. 
8. That paragraph no. 12 of the "Judgment and Decree of Divorce" states: 
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There is awarded to the defendant in his capacity as a Trustee, 214,639 shares of 
common stock in Cambric Graphics, Inc. The defendant shall hold and deal with the 
same as Trustee for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of the two minor children who 
are of issue of this marriage pursuant to the terms of a Trust Agreement to be prepared, 
agreed to and executed by the plaintiff and defendant pursuant to this Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. The said Trust Agreement shall, in addition to normal and usual 
provisions with respect to investing and preserving the assets and income for the use and 
benefit of the children, provide (1) for annual accountings to be made by the defendant 
to the plaintiff in her capacity as guardian of the children, (n) for disbursement for the 
benefit of the children for their health, education, welfare, missions for the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and for their post-high school education, with the corpus 
to be distributed to the children in equal shares upon their respective 25th birthdays, and 
(ni) in the event of defendant's death Zion's Bank and Trust Company shall become the 
substitute trustee. 
9. That on or about May 31, 1996, Keith E. Taylor ("Mr. TaylorM) filed with this 
Court an "Entry of Appearance," in this matter for Petitioner. 
10. That on or about June 18, 1996, James P. Cowley filed a "Notice of Withdrawal 
of Counsel," withdrawing as counsel of record for Petitioner. 
11. That on or about August 1, 1996, Petitioner, through her attorney Mr. Taylor, filed 
a "Motion to Compel Defendant to Sign Trust Agreement or, in the Alternative, to Amend the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce and for Certain Other Relief ("Motion to Compel") supported 
by a memorandum in support of the motion and the affidavits of both Keith E. Taylor and 
Petitioner. 
12. That the Motion to Compel moves the Court in the alternative to either compel 
Respondent to sign the trust agreement prepared by her counsel (and attached as an exhibit to the 
motion) or award Petitioner the shares of stock. That the motion also asked the Court to order 
Respondent to: pay to Petitioner $218.90 in child support that Respondent allegedly wrongfully 
withdrew from his June 1996 child support payment, to use ordinary U S mail to communicate 
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with Petitioner, and further to award Petitioner fees and costs relating to the motion. 
13. That the "Marc Richard Hansen Irrevocable Trust Agreement" ("Petitioner's 
proposed trust agreement") attached to the Motion to Compel has as the following relevant 
provisions: 
a. Article 1: Trust Estate. "[. . .] The trust estate shall also include 
cash and stock dividends, stock splits and intangibles of every kind and 
description which arise directly and indirectly from the ownership of said stock." 
b. Article 3: Dividends. "Additional stock resulting from stock 
dividends, stock splits or other intangible rights associated with said common 
stock shall be retained by Trustee as part of the Trust Estate. Cash dividends shall 
be paid and distributed directly to the custodial parent or the guardian of Krista 
Hansen and Taylor Hansen." 
c Article 4: Successor Trustee. "In the event that Trustee herein 
designated ceases or fails so to serve for any reason, including but not limited to 
death or disability, Jane shall become Trustee in his stead. In the event that Jane 
shall fail or cease to act as Trustee for any reason, Zions First National Bank shall 
act as substitute Trustee in her place." 
d. Article 5: Disposition of the Trust Estate During the Term of the 
Trust. "The stock and other property of the Trust Estate may not be encumbered, 
sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of without first obtaining the written 
consent of Jane, or in the event of her prior death or disability, the legal guardian 
of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen during their minority or their respective 
consents after reaching the age of majority." [. . .] "Payments or distributions to 
or for the benefit of the beneficiaries either before or after their reaching the age 
of 18 years shall not diminish in any way Settlor's obligation to pay child support 
under the Decree." [. . .] "In the event that either Krista or Taylor shall not 
survive to the date of the termination of this Trust, his or her interest shall be 
immediately allocated to the survivor of Krista or Taylor. In the event that both 
of them shall die before reaching their 25th birthday, all of the assets of the Trust 
Estate shall be immediately transferred to Jane and this trust shall terminate." 
e. Article 6: Powers of the Trustee. "In addition to the powers 
specifically herein bestowed upon Trustee, Trustee shall have general trustee 
powers as provided by Utah statutes and regulations." 
14. That Petitioner's memorandum in support of her Motion to Compel states: "The 
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primary thrust of this motion is to deal with marital property which is ordered to be placed in 
trust under the terms of the final Judgment and Decree of Divorce." That the memorandum 
further states facts in support of Petitioner's position that the stock to be held in trust is "clearly 
marital property," citing case law in support of that position That the memorandum further 
alleges that during settlement negotiations Respondent represented that he needed to retain voting 
control over the stock and for that reason she was "willing to have her marital share of the stock 
placed in trust for the exclusive benefit of her children, provided that her children would be 
guaranteed the benefit in the success of the business if defendant (Ms. Hansen) were, indeed, to 
succeed in attaining his financial goals regarding the stock." That the memorandum further states 
that "[pjlaintiff made clear during settlement negotiations that any implementing agreement must 
guarantee that defendant himself would not benefit directly or indirectly, except for the exercise 
of voting control, from the ownership of the marital portion of the stock." That the memorandum 
further states that if Respondent continues to refuse to agree to Petitioner's terms that she should 
be, as a matter of law and equity, awarded half of the stock as her equitable share of the marital 
estate. 
15. That the Motion to Compel alleges that the parties were thereafter unable to agree 
on an acceptable form of trust agreement. 
16. That the memorandum in support of the Motion to Compel further addresses the 
other issues in the Motion to Compel, respectively: 
a. Unilateral deduction of past insurance premiums. Counsel for Petitioner 
alleges: "That it would be unfair to permit Mr. Hansen to withdraw his portion of several 
cumulative insurance premiums in one lump-sum from one child support payment after 
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having failed to do so when he should have, which is on a monthly basis; That 
Petitioner's having done so "interferes significantly with plaintiffs cash flow and her 
ability to care for the minor children of the parties," and that "[f]urther, given the vast 
difference in the parties' respective incomes, equity decries defendant's unilateral 
deduction over plaintiffs objection. . .," and that Respondent, having not deducted the 
insurance premiums when he could have, has thus waived his "right to deduct these 
amounts from child support." 
b. Defendant's use of registered mail for support payments. Counsel for 
Petitioner alleges that Respondent's use of registered mail is very inconvenient and costly 
for her as she must, to retrieve the registered mail, retain a babysitter and make a special 
trip to the post office. That counsel for Petitioner has repeatedly requested that 
Respondent use the regular mail and that the requests have been ignored. 
c. Attorneys' fees and costs. Counsel for Petitioner alleges that Ms Taylor 
is due attorneys' fees and costs relating to the motion as a result of both the bad faith of 
Respondent and the parties's respective incomes. 
17. That Petitioner filed with the Motion to Compel her own affidavit setting forth 
the grounds for her belief that the shares of stock are in fact marital property, and alleging that 
because of Respondent's "business ethics during her marriage" she expects him to "take any 
advantage he can to profit himself personally from the stock which is the subject of the trust. 
Petitioner further alleges that Respondent, during negotiations, had taken the position that the 
shares of stock were valueless, apparently contravened by an undated newspaper clip from the 
Salt Lake Tribune reporting that a Canadian subsidiary of Cambric Graphics (which company's 
6 
ownership is represented by the disputed shares of stock) had reported that it had received a 10.5 
million dollar order. 
18. That both the Affidavit of Keith E. Taylor, attached as a exhibit to the Motion to 
Compel, and the memorandum in support contain transcriptions of parts of a letter written by Mr. 
Taylor to counsel for Respondent in which, in pertinent part, is stated by Mr. Taylor: "You did 
not designate any specific paragraph of the draft which I sent over that was inconsistent with the 
Decree. I have reviewed it again and I can find nothing in the Decree which is any way 
inconsistent with the terms of the trust agreement I sent over." 
19. That on or about August 15, 1996, counsel for Respondent filed a memorandum 
in opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Compel, alleging in introduction that Respondent "has 
complied fully with the stipulated Decree of Divorce and vigorously opposes Plaintiffs Motion 
to Compel. Plaintiffs motion asks this Court to compel the Defendant to enter into a Trust 
Agreement in contravention of the parties' divorce decree. Consequently, Plaintiffs motion 
amounts to a motion to modify the parties' divorce decree. As such, Plaintiffs motion is 
procedurally defective and should therefore be denied." 
20. That Respondent's memorandum states that Petitioners proposed trust agreement 
"contains provisions not contemplated by the divorce decree" such as: 1. the distribution of cash 
dividends to the custodial parent; 2. Petitioner, rather than Zion's Bank, is listed as substitute 
trustee; 3. that the stock may not be sold or encumbered without the written consent of 
Petitioner or the children's legal guardian, and 4. that in the event of the children's death, their 
interest reverts to Petitioner. 
21. That Respondent's memorandum alleges that by asking the Court to compel 
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Respondent to sign the Petitioner's proposed trust agreement, Petitioner is in effect moving the 
Court to modify the divorce decree, that no petition to modify has been filed with the Court, nor 
served on the Respondent, and that Petitioner's motion is thus procedurally defective and should 
therefore be dismissed. 
22. That in regards to the issue of child support and the deducted insurance premiums, 
Respondent's memorandum alleges that there was no deduction from child support, rather, it was 
deducted from an installment payment pursuant to the divorce decree, which states that the 
Petitioner "may deduct from the child support one-half of the cost incurred to keep the children 
so insured." That Respondent alleges that the decree contains no provisions setting forth the 
method by which the insurance premiums must be paid, nor does it mention waiver, and as a 
consequence, Petitioner's request of the Court is once again an improper request to modify and 
should be denied. 
23. That in response to Petitioner's request that the Respondent use the ordinary U.S. 
mail, Respondent agrees to this request and states that his reasons for using registered mail in the 
past have only been to protect himself from allegations that the support payments were not 
mailed. 
24. That Respondent alleges that the Petitioner is not due any attorney's fees or costs, 
in that Respondent has tried to comply with the divorce decree, and has in fact executed a Trust 
Agreement (which was attached as an exhibit), which the Petitioner has thus far refused to sign. 
25. Respondent further alleges that Respondent, rather than Petitioner, is due costs and 
attorney's fees under Rule 11 because Petitioner's Motion to Compel is not warranted by existing 
law in that it is in fact an improperly pleaded and filed petition to modify, citing case law in 
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support of that point 
26. That on or about August 23, 1996, Petitioner filed with the Court a reply 
memorandum to Respondent's memorandum in opposition. In his reply, Petitioner contends that 
"the thrust of Plaintiffs motion is to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to interpret the existing 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce consistent with the understanding and desire of the parties when 
they entered into the agreement which led to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce[.]," and that 
since Respondent has not controverted the evidence under oath filed in support of the motion, 
the evidence should be accepted as uncontroverted for the purpose of disposing of the motion. 
27. That Petitioner's reply states that the issue raised by her Motion to Compel is the 
"appropriate form of Trust Agreement, the details of which were not prescribed in the Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce." 
28. That Petitioner's reply further states in relation to Respondent's practice of using 
registered, rather than ordinary mail, that "the uncontroverted evidence submitted with the motion 
demonstrates his knowledge of the substantial inconvenience that his continuing conduct was 
causing to Plaintiff." Petitioner further contends that it was "only under the duress of facing this 
motion" that Respondent has agreed to petitioner's wishes to use ordinary mail. 
29. That Petitioner's reply withdraws her request to "amend the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce." 
30. That Petitioner's reply tells the Court that if it does not grant the relief as 
requested, Petitioner will file an appropriate new petition to modify the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce, but that it is Petitioner's "position that such petition is not necessary to afford to the 
Plaintiff the relief to which she is obviously entitled under the uncontroverted facts now before 
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the Court." 
31. That on or about September 11, 1996, Petitioner filed another motion with the 
Court, this one entitled: "Motion for Judgment for Delinquent Child Care Costs and for Other 
Relief (Petitioner's Motion 2"). 
32. That petitioner's Motion 2 asks for judgment against the Respondent on account 
of his failing to pay delinquent child care costs incurred by the Petitioner, and directing 
Respondent to pay future child care costs within 7 days of the receipt by him of claim supported 
by receipts evidencing the amounts expended. That Petitioner's Motion 2 further requests the 
Court to grant the Petitioner attorney's fees and costs associated with Petitioner's Motion 2. That 
the motion includes, as Exhibit A, a letter from Petitioner's counsel to Respondent's counsel 
noting an enclosed "itemization of child care costs." That the enclosed sheet is mostly 
handwritten and contains no statements as to the identity of the child care provider except for that 
printed and stamped on one receipt dated July 9, 1996, with the caption "tuition for July 10, 
1996," totaling $27.00. 
33. That on or about September 23, 1996, Respondent filed a response to Petitioner's 
Motion 2, alleging that the Decree of Divorce clearly sets forth that "the defendant shall, per the 
applicable statutes, reimburse the plaintiff for one half of any child care costs and/or expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff as a result of her career and/or occupational training and/or 
employment." 
34. That Respondent's response further states that Respondent's attorney mailed a letter 
(which was attached as an exhibit) to Petitioner's former counsel on April 9, 1996, stating 
Respondent's need for the information and requesting her schedule, a statement indicating that 
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the receipts are for child care expenses while she was employed or in training, and receipts for 
child care indicating the dates and time and the name, address, and telephone number of the child 
care provider. The response states that the Respondent will comply with the decree and the law 
as soon as Petitioner provides to him the appropriate information , and that no attorneys' fees are 
appropriate. 
35. That the oral argument in front of the Court on September 24, 1996 was not 
especially helpful to the court on the issues that Petitioner raises in his motion, but the following 
positions of the parties were argued: 
a. Petitioner alleged that during negotiations prior to the stipulated Decree, 
the parties envisioned that the trust agreement was only to allow the Respondent to be 
able to retain voting rights over the shares of stock, and that he was by no means 
otherwise to benefit from the stock. 
b. Petitioner further alleged that the trust agreement needed to be in the form 
proposed by the Petitioner because of Respondent's alleged "bad business practices and 
past bad conduct," or else the children will be "beaten out of their property," relying once 
again, as exemplary support for this position, on the single allegation of misrepresentation 
of the value of the Cambric stock by the Respondent. Petitioner alleged, citing no 
evidence, that Respondent might want to sell the minimally valuable stock to a friend in 
a sham sale, and that then when the stock became valuable, reap the rewards while his 
children are left with nothing but the few dollars from the sham sale. 
c. Respondent stated that he would never have agreed to the terms of the 
Divorce Decree if it could be construed to encompass the terms of the Trust Agreement 
1 1 
proposed by the Petitioner, in that there never was any agreement reached on the issue 
of whether the shares of stock were marital property, and that Respondent had always 
contended that they were not marital property. Respondent also stated that it was clear 
during the negotiations that Respondent needed unencumbered control over the shares of 
stock, and that he would not have signed the decree if he had thought that it would give 
the power to Petitioner to consent to or deny every transaction involving the stock, 
whether it be a sale, merger, acquisition or any of various other transactions. 
d. Respondent specifically objected to the Petitioner's proposed trust 
agreement in the areas of: 1: the assent required of the Petitioner on sales, encumbrances, 
etc; 2. the reversionary interest of Petitioner; 3. making Petitioner, rather than Zion's 
Bank the substitute trustee; 4. the distribution of cash dividends directly to the custodial 
parent, in that Petitioner had already been awarded spousal support and child support. 
e. Respondent stated that the Decree, written by counsel for Petitioner, set 
forth that the Trust Agreement was to be in accordance with "normal and usual provisions 
with respect to investing and preserving the assets and income of the trust for the use and 
benefit of the children," and additionally provide for: 1. an annual accounting to the 
Petitioner; 2. disbursements for the children for their health education, welfare, L.D.S. 
church missions and post high school education; 3. equal distributions of the trust corpus 
to each of the two children on their reespective 25th birthdays; and 4. that Zions Bank 
and Trust was to be the substitute trustee. 
f Respondent further stated that it was always his intention that the shares 
were for the sole and exclusive benefit of the children as the Decree set forth, not the 
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Petitioner, and that the trust estate was protected the same as any other trust estate, by the 
trustee fiduciary duties set forth by Utah law (citing U.C.A. § 75-7-302 "Trustee's 
standard of care and performance"). 
g. Further, Respondent stated, Utah law sets forth the powers of a trustee at 
U.C.A. § 75-7-402, and that the terms "norma/ and usual" in the decree referring to the 
trust would encompass these statutory powers, as they were not restricted by the decree, 
and that the statutory powers explicitly grant to the trustee the powers that Petitioner is 
attempting to restrict by her proposed trust agreement. 
h. Further, Respondent alleged, that Petitioner's attempt to compel 
Respondent to sign the Petitioner's proposed trust agreement is in effect an attempt to 
modify the Decree by forcing the Respondent to sign the agreement, which gives powers 
and interests to the Petitioner not encompassed by the decree nor agreed to by the 
Respondent, in lieu of the terms of the decree. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Trust Agreement 
Nature and Effect of Stipulations 
There has been no argument by Petitioner as to the binding nature of the stipulated 
divorce agreement embodied by the final divorce documents, both entered into and signed by 
both parties in this case Nevertheless, these documents and their interpretation are essentially 
at the heart of this case, thus the Court feels that a brief discussion on this point would be 
helpful. Regarding the binding nature of stipulations, the Utah Court of Appeals' stated in 
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Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P 2d 210, 212 (Utah App. 1988) that "[a] stipulation is an enforceable 
agreement if it meets the requirements of formality outlined in Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 
(Utah App. 1987)." According to Brown, to indicate the parties' assent, the stipulation must be 
"reduced to writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record before the court." 744 
P.2d at 335. The final divorce documents meet those requirements, thus, any subsequent attempt 
by either party to alter the terms as set forth in the stipulation would be inappropriate absent a 
properly filed petition to modify. Having met these requirements, their stipulations are subject 
to the rules of contract interpretation. (See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 
1112, 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Under basic rules of contract interpretation, the intent of the parties is to be determined 
first from the writing itself. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. 899 P.2d 
766, 770 (Utah 1995). However, if the meaning of the contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence 
is admissible. Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. A contract is considered ambiguous if it is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies. Id Finally, if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify the intent of 
the parties, it will be construed against the drafter. Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 
61, 63-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The aforementioned rules notwithstanding, the parol evidence rule operates to exclude 
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose 
of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. Hall v. Process Instruments & 
Control. Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995). Thus, "before considering the applicability of 
the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the court must first determine that the parties 
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 Hall at 1026 [cit ing Union Bank v. S w e n s o n , 707 P.2d 
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terms Hal] at 1026-27 [citing Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483, 487 
(Utah 1986)]. 
It appears that the primary matter before the Court can essentially be characterized as a 
motion to request that the Court interpret the Decree to determine if the Petitioner's proposed trust 
agn^iiirni | nil", mill (In i ;»d forth in the Decree, and if the answer is in the affirmative, 
to compel Respondent to execute such agreement This was essentially stated as the Petitioner's 
desire titic .ei its, a i i :1 c 3e i ii i tl lis i i ia in: n u 
final divorce documents, a^  . .mently filed,1 as a reference against which the Petitioner's Proposed 
Trust Agreement U m u ,-
Integration 
At oral argument, Petitioner made the statement that "it was unfortunate" that Petitioner's 
, ,. ., . , - auree to and actually execute a 
final i'usi document before the divorce became final. Petitioner asserts that had the parties done 
!
 In her reply to Respondent's memorandum in opposition, Petitioner stated that she was 
v "l ' iwinr *v>o ^e rna tn 'e Motion to Amend included as part of the Motion to Compel, 
1 he Court rejects Petitioner's argument that the "evidei ice" filed by Petitioner should 
be "accepted as uncontroverted" in that it has not been rebutted by Respondent. Respondent, 
in his Memorandum in Opposition, has set forth the terms of the stipulated Decree that 
specifically rebut every one of Petitioner's allegations as to the trust agreement This, in 
itself, is the best evidence of the parties' intentions as to the trust agreement. As the bulk of 
the alleged "uncontroverted facts" relate to the issue of marital property, a subject not 
properly before the Court, those facts do not need to be corit!overted. 
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evident from the trust document Respondent adamantly opposes Petitioner's position, stating in 
pleadings and at oral argument that there never was any agreement to the Petitioner's proposed 
terms, and that in fact there never would have been any stipulation to the final divorce documents 
had he known that the documents might be interpreted to include such terms. Respondent objects 
to: 1. any trust terms establishing control or oversight of trust assets by Petitioner, 2. any trust 
terms evidencing a marital property interest in the trust assets, such as a remainder interest, 3. 
the Petitioner as substitute trustee; and 4. any automatic, rather than discretionary, cash dividend 
distribution. 
With respect to integration, the Utah Supreme Court has recently stated: "An integrated 
agreement is defined as 'a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms 
of an agreement.'" Hall, 890 P.2d at 1027 [quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
209 (1981)]. Regarding integration, any relevant evidence would be admissible. Id. at 1026. 
The Hall Court also stated. "Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view 
of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to 
be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not 
constitute a final expression." Id. at 1027. [quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
209(3) (1981)] Also, the Court stated: "an apparently complete and certain agreement which the 
parties have reduced to writing will be conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement. 
Id. at 1026 [quoting Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981)] 
The Court must therefore, initially, determine if the terms of the contract are "complete." 
With respect to that determination, the Court finds it very significant that the Findings of Fact 
includes the statement: "All matters relating to child custody, property division, and alimony have 
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been agreed to by the parties and are set forth in detail in the Ji idgn lent and Decree of Divorce 
subn ntted by tl le parties an.: ^niere - , *. 
emphatic statement as to integration could hardly be made if the phrase "this agreement 
represents an integration" was substituted in its place. Nevertheless, with respect to each v 
4 ?u .'.--mentioned disputed terms, the Court will make a determination as to their respective 
"completeness If the Court determines that the term is not "complete," then by using extrinsic 
e\ idei ice, 1:1 i i C : it n: l: i l l ::! zl i i: i i in i i tl i i integi ated i i lea i in ig :: i tl i :: I = i i i i, i i i :i if tl \ : 11 = i: i i i is 
"complete," then by using extrinsic evidence, the meaning of any ambiguous terms. 
1 Control or oversight by Petitioner as to trust assets 
Paragraph 12 of the Decree sets forth the only mention in the divorce documents 
relating to the assets that are to be held ii i trust,,,. With respect to trustee puwers in 
-^ AV« n states: "in addition to normal and usual provision with respect 
i. -.vesting and preserving the assets and income of the trust for the use and benefit of 
plaintiff m he? capacity as guardian, of the children '"" Neither in the final divorce 
documents themselves, nor in the subsequei it pleadii lgs, i ic: r at • : i all: a i g in i i„ei it, 1 ia,s 1:1 i i 
Petitioner attempted to enlighten the Court as to the meaning of "normal and usual" with 
respect to trustee powers. There has been no case law submitted by either party, nor has 
the Court been able to find any helpful case law on the subject. Respondent, n i 1 lis 
counsel's oral argument, made reference to Utah Code Ann § 75-7-402, "Powers of 
• !
 f ' ", time of creation of the trust until final distribution 
of the assets of \h-: trust, a trustee has the power to perform. 
17 
without court authorization, every act which a prudent man would 
perform for the purposes of the trust, including the powers 
specified in Subsection (3). 
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the powers 
granted by this part, a trustee has a duty to act with due regard to 
his obligation as a fiduciary, according to the standard set forth in 
Section 75-7-302. 
(emphasis added) Subsection (3) specifically gives unto the trustee, along with many 
other enumerated powers, power, subject to subsections (1) and (2), to encumber, sell, 
transfer, or otherwise dispose of the trust assets. Section 75-7-401 states that a trustee 
shall have "all powers conferred upon him by the provisions of this part unless limited 
in the trust instrument." Paragraph 12 of the Decree lists 3 provisions or restrictions 
relating to the trustee's power. None of these three provisions would give Petitioner the 
powers that she seeks. It is the Court's opinion that "normal and usual" trustee powers 
are those enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402. With that section as a reference, 
the term of the Decree relating to trustee powers needs no further reference to be said that 
"in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete 
agreement." Therefore, it is the Court's opinion that that term is fully integrated, and 
extrinsic parol evidence will only be admitted to clarify any ambiguous terms. 
Petitioner claims that the powers granted by the terms of Petitioner's proposed trust 
agreement, to whit, that Petitioner would have the final decision making power over any 
encumbering, selling, transferring or other disposal of the trust assets, were intended and 
agreed upon by the parties, or possibly in the alternative, that Respondent's alleged newly 
discovered deception or previously known dishonest business practices makes such terms 
necessary. Nowhere in paragraph 12, nor elsewhere in the Decree, is any mention made 
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.en to or retained by tlic Petitions »i ., is the latter alternative 
argument that Petiti* "i'i is espousing, the Court can offer no relief under this motion, as 
•» .- oleadings, and would 
i 
more properly be th- object of a petition i - modil\ : perhaps J Rule oi)(b) motion * 
Petitioner has presented no eviu..^ . ^ , • • r 
counsel, that the parties had intended, at the time of the signing of the Decree, that the 
trust agreement would give Petitioner final consent power over the disposition. o< J ^ . n 
r»v -K.r'K p r ! f I he Court does not find the term of the Decree relating to trustee 
powers ambiguous. Even if the Court had found the term ambiguous, the Court finds that 
(heir Iiii:» I.I'I " "ii < I'M." ""i1 " " | *" P^ •• • fHt -; '"1 '1 ( hrnlv any aiieged 
ambiguity, thus any such ambiguity will be construed against Petitioner, the drafter. 
(Trolley Square, Ut, i 2d at 63 6 1.) 
The Court finds that the term of the Decree relating to trustee powers is clear, 
integrated and enforceable as it stands. I here are no provisions in paragrapli 
ii wli'Mf c| ,i nil fhn iifi'vrec that would give to Petitioner the powers that she seeks.4 I he 
"The appropriate procedui e - . ^ such, notice and obtain, relief from a judgment 
based, oi i a n listakenly executed stipuum-n is to file a motion pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 60 
(b)(1), seeking relief because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," within 
three months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered." Maxwell v. Maxwell, "':'> 
P.2d 403, 406 (Utah. Ct. App. 1.990) 
4
 The issue is not before the Court, but it appears, from the nature of the powers 
that Petitioner seeks to have imposed as a result of her proposed trust agreement, that she 
seeks to effectively be named as a co-trustee of the trust assets, along with Respondent. 
There is absolutely no provision in the Decree for this, and the Court finds it somewhat 
incredible that Petitioner would have the Court believe that this provision could somehow be 
read into the language of the Decree Furthermore, Petitioner has presented absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever to explain why the assets of the trust would not be protected in exactly 
the same fashion as are the assets of all other tn ists in this state., that is, by the beneficiaries' 
19 
Court hereby denies Petitioner's motion as to this term. 
2. Petitioner's remainder interest 
Petitioner's proposed trust agreement gives a remainder interest to Petitioner in the 
event that she is predeceased by both children. Unfortunately, paragraph 12 is completely 
silent on this point. Paragraph 12 states only that the beneficiary interest in the trust 
assets is to be shared equally by both children, with each child's share of the corpus to 
be distributed upon their respective 25th birthdays. 
The fact that the terms of the Decree are not as specific as to the disposition of 
the trust assets in the unfortunate event that the children predecease their mother does not 
demonstrate that the term is unenforceable or unclear as written. Paragraph 12 is clear 
and unambiguous as to the intent of the parties on this point - the trust was to benefit the 
children, and the trust corpus was to be distributed to them on their 25th birthdays. 
Possibly it might be argued, but it was not, that the remainder interest is a purely 
collateral matter to the beneficial interest of the children, and that parol evidence would 
thus be admissible on the point. Counsel for Petitioner, both orally and in pleadings, 
made the argument that the shares of stock were in fact marital property, and that both 
parties had allegedly agreed to this fact prior to the signing of the decree. In opposition, 
Respondent's counsel stated that Respondent would not have agreed to the Decree if he 
had known that it would be construed to say that the shares to be held in trust were in 
fact marital property. However, as stated before, any such arguments would be more 
rights against Respondent arising from the prudent investor rule, and the fiduciary duties of 
trustees codified by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-301, et seq. 
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'-int^d I | | Ilh liilii il piMition to i i lodify or Rule 60(b) i notion, i ather than this motion, 
which is simply to compel the Respondent to sign a trust agreement consistent with the 
Iri nr. I ill deuce 
The Decree makes no mention whatsoever of the shares of stock being marital 
property, rather it states onl. ..; ^ , 
children. It is the Court's opinion that if Respondent .had agreed that Petitionei would 
have a remainder interest, or any interest at ,i;: -••. :<••.• shares of stock, such would have 
l' - n iih,hhl',d in Ih D'Trer, :i I it is not. Perhaps it is unfortunate that the Decree did 
not elaborate more on this point... Nevertheless, the Coin 1: will not compel Respondent to 
sign a ti i ist .giuen- * ] -^or, 
Petitioner's motion as it relates to the Court compelling Respondent to sign, a proposed 
trust agreement giving her any remainder interest is liut"b\ denied 
3. Substitute Ti us tee 
On this point Petitioner's proposed trust agreement is so diametrically opposed to 
f>
 <ee that any annment that the terms are in accord 
must simply be dismissed as nonsensical. The Decree plainly states, that, in the event of 
s
 In her Memorandum, in Suppoi t of t.l le Motioi i to Coi i ipel, Petitioner makes iTiany fine 
arguments as to how the shares of stock should in fact be considered marital property Her 
counsel reads passages from Respondent's deposition testimony that would appear to be quite 
relevant to any discussion as to marital property, however, it does not evidence the 
Respondent's intentions concerning the disposition of what might possibly have beeiI iii.mui; 
property In crashing silence, the decree makes no mention of any of these intentions. IiI 
contrast, the Decree does set forth in detail the distribution of many other items of real and 
personal property. Whatever reasons the parties had i:- i.<^ iudmg the shares of stock in 
the distribution of marital property, they were not ^hus the ( i.:-1 v,d- interpret the Decree as 
written,, and stipulated to, by tine parties. 
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Respondent's death, the substitute trustee shall be Zions Bank and Trust. Petitioner's 
proposed trust agreement states, that in the event that respondent should cease or fail to 
serve for any reason, including but not limited to death or disability, as trustee, that 
Petitioner shall become substitute trustee in his stead. Once again, Petitioner seeks to 
introduce terms not contemplated by the divorce decree. The provision as to substitute 
trustee is clear, unambiguous, and in the Court's opinion, an integrated expression of the 
parties intentions as to this point. No evidence as to the parties' prior or contemporaneous 
intentions on this point was presented by either party, thus the term will be therefor 
construed against the drafter. To compel Respondent to execute an agreement naming 
Petitioner as substitute trustee would be against the express terms of the Decree. This the 
Court will not do, and thus the Petitioner's motion as it relates to this term is hereby 
denied. 
4. Disposition of Cash Dividends 
The Decree is completely silent as to any provision relating to the disposition of 
cash dividends. As stated above, the Decree does make provisions for "disbursement for 
the benefit of the children" in connection with several fairly broad purposes, which are 
relatively well restated by the correlating terms of "Article 5" of Petitioner's proposed 
trust agreement. In "Article 3" of Petitioner's proposed trust agreement, Petitioner has 
interposed the requirement that "[c]ash dividends shall be immediately paid and 
distributed to the custodial parent or guardian" of the children." It is important to note 
that Respondent has already agreed, in the Decree, to pay Petitioner both child support 
and alimony. As mentioned above, Respondent disputes that Petitioner is entitled to any 
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interest whatsoever in the assets of the trust, and there is no mention in the Decree of any 
interest of Petitioner in the trust assets 1 here has been no evidence presented .- . . .. ,: 
pfihilr I'pfiiinner to cash dividends from the trust assets. Nevertheless, Petitioner requests 
! ; 
that the Court compel Respondent to sign her proposed trust agreement giving her cash 
that includes terms not contemplated by the Decree. r'v.s p-*mt, then, Petitioner's 
motion is also denied.. 
In conclusion of the discussion as to the trust agreement trmv, as the Utah Supreme 
Court stated in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Inv., Inc., . „ , .... 
(Utai ise the Petitioner), after having stipulated to a judgment, "should 
not feel too badly abused" by not being allowed to renege on, its stipulation, 
B. W i t h h e 1 d I n s u i a n c e P" i e m i u i i i, s 
Petitioner also seeks to have the Court compel Respondent to reimburse Petitioner for !li< 
I*.... - tnai ;,L *_.,, ... uu j . _ :w 
amount was "wrongfully" withdrawn, over her objections P-nnoner claims thai b\ doing so, 
Respondent has significantly interfered with her cash-flow, ,i: /.a. c: a hardship ot. ^ 
! I,! •TI" and Petitioner. Petitioner further claims that even if Respondent is entitled to withdraw 
his portion of the health insurance premium, from his monthly child support payments, he must 
:o be 
deducted and then hmip them at any given point in time" Petitioner claims thru -A 
voluntarily tailing !•> n:i\ ' ' • i • •• 
to this money. 
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Respondent, in his reply, and at oral argument counters that the amount was not deducted 
from child support, but was in fact deducted from an "installment payment" to be made to 
Petitioner under the decree. [Paragraph 6(d) of the Decree?] Further, Respondent states that the 
decree is silent as to the method by which the premiums may be deducted, and there is no 
provision in the Decree regarding waiver. Respondent is correct - once again the Decree is silent 
on a point that Petitioner would rather that it had addressed - this time as to the method or time 
period for deducting Respondent's portion of health insurance premiums. 
In support of her position that Respondent's failure to withdraw the insurance premiums 
represents a waiver, he states that "[ujnder Utah law, waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of 
a known right," citing two cases for that proposition. One of the cases cited, Soter's v. Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) appears to be the best Utah authority 
regarding the elements of a waiver. The Supreme Court makes clear that three elements are 
required for the finding of a waiver. 1. an existing right, benefit or advantage; 2. a knowledge 
of its existence; and, 3. an intention to relinquish it. Id., at 942. The Court makes the 
observation that in most cases, as in this case, the first two elements are not in dispute, rather it 
is ordinarily the "intention" to relinquish that must be found. Id., at 940. Therefor, the Court 
must determine if Respondent's failure to withdraw the monthly insurance premiums was intended 
as a waiver of his right to those premiums. The Supreme Court states that to qualify as such, 
it must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was "distinct," in light of 
the "totality of the circumstances." Id., at 942 and n6. 
In this case, as related by counsel for Respondent at oral arguments, and unrebutted by 
Petitioner, Respondent had to wait several months before a determination could be reached by 
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his company and his insurance company writ i respect to the exact amount tl lat Respondent was 
payii ig for the children's health insurance. During this time, and at all ott iter times, Respondent 
Ii r h til i i i in I I In! ii|iniit and was paying the children's health insui ance. Rather than 
deduct the wrong amount, Respondent states that he chose to wait to deduct the amount until the 
l X
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support, but from installment payments that Respondent was to make to Petitioner. 
During the time that Respondent was not deductii ig tl :t 2 am: i i o n in: i t if i • :»t :t i I! lis cl lild si lppc i It 
payment, Petitioner was entitled to an extra almost $44.00 per month as child support, while 
Respondent was paying this amount towards the children's insurance premium. Petitioner 
ecu i lplaii is of tl it. :i i! i :! if/ii lit; • ;:: f 1 :in 3i 1 laviiig to have her cash flow interrupted in this manner, yet 
surely she knew that the insurance premium was not being deducted from the prior checks. 
and that she was thereby in jured. 
in view oi »ie taci ,;.ai Petitioner knew that Re^pondi nil i ouhl ilniluil In | N i in 11 in I t i n 
premiums from child support, the Respondent 's stated reason for not having made the deductions; 
the silence of the Decree as to any term regarding the time or methou -. ,..,.-, deduction; the 
absent - oi •,
 w a i v e r m ^ £ ) e c r e e j the ongoing current status of Respondent 's 
child support payments , the short duration in time in which the deductions were not made; and 
'ii'jm . the totality 
of tlse circumstances, Petitioner has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Respondent waived his nghl h" ill" I , lalcdly ilnlm I il IIIMIMIII ' pi niiiiiini1 I1" ,| ii'l"iil \\\v 
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fully within his rights in deducting the accumulated insurance premiums.6 Therefore the Court 
hereby denies Petitioner's motion on this point. 
C. Mail issue 
It appears that the parties have reached agreemnt on this issue of the Motion to Compel, 
thus the Court will not address it. 
In conclusion, based on the facts and reasons set forth above, the Court hereby denies, 
in the entirety, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. On the other hand, it appears that the Respondent's 
executed Trust Agreement, enclosed as an exhibit in his memorandum in opposition, appears to 
track the Decree rather well. Respondent, at oral argument, requested that the Court compel 
Petitioner to sign Respondent's trust agreement. At this juncture, the Court is not inclined to take 
such action but would instead direct the parties to get together and execute a trust agreement that 
comports with the provisions of the Decree, including extra language only as agreed upon by the 
parties. 
D. Attorney's Fees 
In her Motion to Compel, Petitioner seeks attorneys' fees and costs relating to the motion, 
alleging that: 
[DJespite repeated efforts of plaintiffs counsel, defendant has refused to execute 
a trust agreement consistent with the intent of the parties when they entered into 
the divorce Settlement Agreement which would make it impossible for defendant, 
The Court makes no determination as to the correct method or interval by which 
Respondent should deduct the insurance premiums, nor does the Court make any 
determination regarding what might constitute a waiver, but realizes that if the premiums were 
to be left undeducted for a much longer period, potentially a waiver could result. 
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under any circumstances, to utilize trust assets for his own use and benefit. 
I i mm met has ' i n n * n l r d <• mill ihr < IM I I I I I IC I I H I I P n m hr i m m m < r n i l i i \\ !H I 11111 1 \\w 1 )y 
alleging $1,500 in attorneys' fees. Respondent 1 eplies in his memorandi im in opposition tl lat 
Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, as Respondent has attempted to abide o\ 
terms of the decree by executing a Trust Agreement in conformance with the Decree. 
Respondent also requests attorneys' fees, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
I'miH1!!1« ' ' ' I in1 I. "Viitior)1'!'" "i " i ," " 'fVi tv c .notion U\ modify I1 
Divorce Decree." As suppoit, Respondent cites Rirru er v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 
(UtaJ 1 Ct p ]:: IS 92) I 1 tl *< X : .a sc • : : : • : f tl 1 1 1 
petition to modify' in the incorrect County, holding that the "choice of forum, was not grounded 
in law or logic." Id., a 
The Utah Court oi Appeals, in discussing Rule 11, states that Rule 11 "requires some 
inquiry into both the facts and the law before the paper is filed; the level of inquiry is tested 
d^n. • -* • .'p,»<t ]- ! — . "I aylor v. Estate of Taylor; 770 
P2d 163 !- P 1989) | quoting ^ ( Wright & A Miller, Federal Practice and 
the behavior absolutely unreasonable. Petitioner has seen fit to file with the Court this Motion 
to Compel, that, as set foi tl 1 above, is \vholl\ without any incut whatsocve I I net. 
She has drawn up a trust agreement that completely ignores and deviates from the plain, 
unambiguous and clear language of the stipulated Decree, alleging that the trust agreement should 
lb :!: it! i a c c o i d Vv it! 1 "tl lie in i tei i t i o n s " o f tl ic parties rather than the language of the stipulated Decree, 
bringing up marital property issues that for all legal purposes were completely disposed of by the 
2 7 
Decree, citing no relevant evidence to these allegedly contrary intentions, plead that Respondent 
has refused to sign this improper agreement, and when her attempts to do so didn't work, 
attempted to couch an obvious petition to modify, or even a Rule 60(b) motion, as a Motion to 
Compel 7 Furthermore, it appears that Petitioner has completely disregarded the case law on the 
binding nature of stipulations 8 There is no merit to Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees, and 
her request for such is hereby denied Conversely, Petitioner has so completely failed to comply 
with Rule 11 that the Court feels an appropriate sanction should be an award to Respondent of 
his attorneys' fees and costs for having to employ counsel to respond to the improper and 
groundless trust issues in Petitioner's Motion to Compel As requested both in his memorandum 
in support and at oral arguments, the Court will award to Respondent attorneys' fees and costs 
for any work performed responding, either by pleading, letter, telephone, or in Court, to the trust 
agreement issues raised by Petitioner's Motion to Compel The Court thereby requests that 
Respondent prepare and submit to the Court an appropriate motion, affidavit setting forth in detail 
the tasks performed, and order for the Court's signature on this matter 
E. Delinquent Child Care Costs 
In Petitioner's second motion before the Court, her "Motion For Delinquent Child Care 
Costs and For Certain Other Relief," Petitioner requests that the Court enter judgment against 
Respondent in the amount of $202 50, representing Respondent's portion of child care costs that 
The Court does not attempt to discern the reasons for Petitioner's behavior, but it is 
noteworthy that it appears that a Rule 60(b) motion would not be timely, further it appears 
dubious on the facts presented that Petitioner would succeed in a petition to modify 
8
 See, eg, Foulger v Foulger, 626 P 2d 412 (Utah 1981), DLB Collection Trust v 
Harris, 893 P 2d 593 (Utah Ct App 1995), and United Factors v T C Assoc's, Inc , 445 P 2d 
766 (Utah 1968), as well as the cases the Court cites above 
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he has allegedly refused to pay, and further directing Respondent to pay future child care costs 
withiii 7 days of receipt of claims for child care costs accompanied by receipts evidencing the 
fxpci i id i l i i r rs . 
Responden t repl ies tllat he will pay the back child care costs when Pet i t ioner suppl ies hn11 
• • it!: in tl i ::: pi: op ei n: if c n i: latioi m till: lat 1 le b slie * es tl: lat II: i ::: is ei: ititled to. I le states tl lat oi i '" pi nil 9 of 
this year his counsel mailed a letter to Petitioner's counsel asking for certain information, 
including (oimation pertaining to I ! ,etitioner's current employment or t r .un?^: ; • .•g;--
her schedule , 3. a statement indicating that the receipts are for child care expenses while 
Peti t ioner was employed or in training; and 4. receipts for child care indicating the dates and t ime 
ui . ^ . t | i e c j 1 1 | ( | c a r e pr0vider. 
Petitioner has submitted an, invoice of sorts appearing to be a photocopied collage of 
worked, some typewritten notation, appearing to be a i-vn, *\jt u;u no reference as to it 
origin or foi what the payment was made, stating "Recorded 1:1;; :: ac, i ii: i :ll • dat i :lll 5 6 96 ; a i IC tl it i r 
handwritten notation stating that Petitioner attended school on July 9, 1996, and making request 
for $13.50 as Respondent's share of child care costs for that day; a signed receipt from Sunshine 
Kids Daycai e foi h ib • 9 IS 96 ii :i tl: :i i a i :i: i ::: i u: it of $27.00, and some other typewritten notation with 
no information at all, with two amounts shown, $126.00 and $140.00. 
\. f t e i R. e s p o i: i d e i: 11 i • i c e i v e :i 11 i i aI: ::»,> 3 ::  II a i :i: i: l , • :: i: i i II, g i I s t 2 6 , IS 9 (:: h • * • ' i :: • 1: • 3 a 1 311 ::: i: !: c •• 
Petitioner referencing the information requested in the April 9th letter, stating that he needed this 
information before he could pay the amounts clan: i: led. 
The Decree itself states that "the defendant shall, per the applicable statutes, reimburse 
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the plaintiff for one half of any child care costs and/or expenses incurred by the plaintiff as a 
result of her career and/or occupational training and/or employment." Utah statutory law on this 
matter is somewhat helpful - Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 states in relevant part: "The child 
support order shall require that each parent share equally the reasonable work-related child care 
expenses of the parents [subsection (])]; "If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent 
shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the 
child care expense" [subsection (2)(a)]; and "a parent who incurs child care expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and identity of the child care provider to the other parent 
upon initial engagement and thereafter on the request of the other parent." [subsection (2)(b)(i)] 
Section 78-45-7.17(2) also states: "The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may 
be awarded on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational training 
of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the interests of justice." As the 
Petitioner, by letter, agrees to forward receipts in the future when making claims, the Court must 
determine if the Petitioner's previously submitted claim for payment meets the necessary standard 
providing him with the information he requests, and then to enter the appropriate corresponding 
order. 
Unfortunately, the Court can find no case law construing the above-referenced portions 
of § 78-45-7.16, possibly because they are relatively new, with an effective date of July 1, 1994. 
The Court can also find no prior Utah case law dealing with this situation on a common-law 
basis. Therefore, the Court must make some determination as to the meaning of such terms as 
"proof of the child care expense," "written verification of the cost and identity of the child care 
provider," "related," and "reasonable." It is the Court's opinion that the words "proof and 
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"written verification" in this context connote some sort of wntu ig by an objective third party A. 
written receipt from the cl nld care provide; v t
 t 
for the one day's child care costs would appear to be acceptable as a receipt for one day. Tl ic 
other notations on the "collage" of claims submitted b> Petitioner have no reference whatsoever 
as t : tl i. ::::!! place c \ : •! igii i, i i : signature as verification, and no information as to dates that costs 
were incurred, and would tl lerefore be unacceptable as "proof 01 "written verification " It is the 
originating from the day care provider, detailing the dates and times that child care expenses were 
incurred. 
The Respondent is somewhat unclear as to the reasons he requests such detailed 
scheduling information, although the Court would presume that it is so that he can cross-reference 
ml Iii -iMpt tnir f» 111ifJh irhilrl care costs are claimed against the dates Petitioner was 
actually working or in scho. = As the statute clearly states that payment is to be paid for those 
not at least be provided with some means by which he can. verify the fact that they were so 
incurred, and \>^, ;!iey were in fact "reasjna; 
note listing the dates Petitioner worked or was in schooling do not meet the necessary level of 
objectivity that is implied by the statute. Counsel io; Petitioner, at oral arguments, related the 
trouble that Petitioner would have to go to get such schedules, and the Court has taken notice of 
this. Nevertheless, it is the Court's opinion that written verification originating from some thir d 
p a, i t. ) ;i! '" o i 11 d b e a |) p i: o p i: i. a t e " s i i i i p 1 e c o p i e d i e p o i t o f' I *' e 1.111 o i: i z i " s w o i I : s c h e d u 1 e would s u f f i c e, 
as would a copy of the class schedule for schooling attended or to be attended by the Petitioner 
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The procurement by the Petitioner and the forwarding to Respondent of these items does not 
appear to the Court to be inordinately burdensome Filed after the hearing, but mailed the day 
of the hearing, is a letter from Counsel for Petitioner to Counsel for Respondent, with, as an 
enclosure, a copy of a letter from the Office of the Registrar of the University of Utah, stating 
that Petitioner is a full time student This may be acceptable as a "statement," but as it lists no 
schedule at all, it certainly does not meet the Court's requirement of a "schedule." With regard 
to the "statements" requested by Respondent, a simple handwritten note, signed by the Petitioner, 
stating the information Respondent requests would suffice, and does not seem to be inequitable, 
either, in view of the fact that she is requesting that Respondent pay her for those costs. 
In view of the above-mentioned reasons, the Court hereby denies Petitioner's Motion for 
Delinquent Child Care Costs and for Certain other Relief. This ruling in no means precludes 
Petitioner from filing a future motion for the same or similar relief if she complies with the 
guidelines set forth above, and the Respondent nevertheless continues to refuse to remit his 
portion of the child care costs. The Court hereby also denies Petitioner attorneys' fees in relation 
to Motion 2. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Court hereby denies both of Petitioner's motions in the entirety, and 
g i a i 11: s atto i n ey s' fe e s ai i d c c s It s t o R esp o i i d e i: n It f6 II: o i I :: p 11 f 61 i i i e dl m i i i e s p o i I s e Ito 11 i o s e i s s I i e s 
involving the trust agreement contained within Petitioner's Motion to Compel 
«vu O c t o b e r ^ ' / , 1996. 
i , v , \ j \ ^ 
MICHAEL G. ALLPfflN i 
DISTRICT n m r a 
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling was mailed on October 
/J\ 1996, first class postage prepaid to the following: 
Keith E. Taylor 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Patricia A. O'Rorke 
O'Rorke & Gardiner, LLC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
6995 Union Park Center, Suite 470 
Midvale, UT 84047 
es E. Merrell 
La\v Clerk to the Honorable Michael G. Allphin 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE • DF I JT.„? I I 
JANE ANN TAYLOR HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MARC RICHARD HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE • Z I l 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 954701212 
IlL'l K >l en. - ^ 1O.L rr 
Basc- irjor. the matters on file herein, including the 
Affidavit tiff and the Stipulation
 ti_\ 
parties endorsed hereon and the Court having heretofore made 
•
i n
^ ^ n ::: :-.-•• >^  -c; J~ T:vj-t and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court now makes and enters it.: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. • • ci • ' -* - -i • i' ven and granted a judgment and 
decree divorcing them from eacn other and severing the bonds of 
matrimony. The divorce shall become final on January 15, 1996 
• : : : i i;:: : n: t, 1:1: i e e i 11: r y h e r e o f , , • I: :i i c h e v e i: :i s 1 a t e r . 
2. The care, custody and control of the two minor 
children who are of issue of the marriage is awarded to the 
J
^0GMENT 
^ENTERED OKU'Jia!) 
<s 
p 
plaintiff, reserving to the defendant the right to visit with u{&?~ 
said children at all reasonable times and places ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^ x^ u^ ^^ -^ -xjJ 
witf^ (AhJ^ Code- Annoh,kjL i 34-3 - 3£, dJ%- T/°c— 
3. Pursuant to the Utah Child Support Guidelines 
and per the worksheet filed contemporaneously herewith, the 
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff as child support for the 
use and benefit of the two minor children the sum of $1,200 per 
month commencing with the month of January 1996 and continuing 
thereafter until further order of the Court. 
4. With respect to and in addition to the child 
support provided for in Paragraph 3, the parties shall be 
governed by the following additional matters with respect to 
the two minor children: 
a. For so long as the defendant has available 
to him through his place of employment health and accident 
insurance coverage, he shall maintain said insurance and such 
coverage for the children and shall pay the premiums therefor 
and may deduct from the child support one-half of the cost 
incurred to keep the children so insured. 
b. The parties shall each pay one-half of all 
uninsured hospital, health care, medical and dental expenses 
for the children including, without limitation, orthodontic and 
optical expenses. 
c. The defendant shall, per the applicable 
statutes, reimburse the plaintiff for one-half of any child 
care costs and/or expenses incurred by the plaintiff as a 
result of her career and/or occupational training and/or employmen 
00342126 #)J 
d. For so long as the defendant promptly piays , , 
the child support as required by Paragraph 3 above and for-co j^& 
Long ac the plaintiff is unemployed, the defendant shall be'""J" r 
entitled to claim both children as dependent exemptions upon 
his federal and state income tax returns. If there is any 
change in circumstances that results in a change in the amount 
of alimony and/or child support, then it will be appropriate 
for the court to also reconsider this paragraph with respeqt to 
the party that is entitled to claim a child or children as 
dependent exemptions. 
e. One-half of the child support required by 
Paragraph 3 above shall be paid by defendant to plaintiff on or 
before the 5th day of the month and the other half shall bq 
paid by defendant to plaintiff on or before the 20th day o4 
each month. 
f. The income of the defendant is subject to 
income withholding in accordance with the provisions of Title 
62A-11-501 et. seq. UCA but withholding shall not be 
implemented unless the defendant fails to promptly pay the 
child support as provided for in Paragraphs 3 and 4 above and 
subparts. 
g. The child support payments by defendant to 
plaintiff shall be in the form of check or other instrument to 
be maintained by the defendant as evidence and proof of hi$ 
timely payment of the child support. 
00342127 
5. For a period of seven years and ending with the 
month of December 2003, (unless defendant's duty to pay alimony 
is terminated at an earlier date in accordance with the laws of 
the state of Utah) the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff as 
alimony on or before January 5, 1996 and on or before the fifth 
day of each month thereafter the sum of $1,100. 
6. There is awarded to the plaintiff as 
her sole separate property the hereinafter described marital 
assets and plaintiff shall pay and discharge the hereinafter 
described liabilities: 
a. One-half of the net proceeds from the 
recent sale of the parties home in Davis County, Utah, together 
with one-half of the cost basis therein (including any carry 
over basis). 
b. The Subaru automobile in possession of and 
operated by the plaintiff free and clear of any encumbrance. 
c. The IRA account at ffjlt. If hi ST* vtst'* *"& 
owned by the parties with an approximate value of $7,600. 
d. $925 in cash, to be paid by defendant to 
plaintiff on or before June 30, 1996. 
e. The bank accounts, furnishings, fixtures, 
personal effects, and other personal property now in 
plaintiff s possession. 
f. Plaintiff shall pay and discharge all debts 
incurred by her since the parties' separation in August 1995. 
00342128 
185X94323 1 ^ 
g. Plaintiff shall pay and discharge her own 
attorneys' fees and costs in this action. i/X^^ $r I 
7. There is awarded to the pljiint-jrff as his sole ^P^ 
separate property the hereinafter described marital assets and 
defendant shall pay and discharge the hereinafter described! 
liabilities: 
a. One-half of the net proceeds from the 
recent sale of the parties home in Davis County, Utah, together 
with one-half of the cost basis therein (including any carry 
over basis). 
b. Isuzu Trooper automobile in possession and 
operated by the defendant subject to the debt thereon which the 
defendant shall assume and pay and from which he shall save and 
hold the plaintiff harmless. ^— i/h Vn 
4 
c. The 401K account at LA^ Irfcc?/~<yX/y$ 
A owned by the parties with an approximate value of $9,450. 
d. 214,639 shares of the common stock of 
Cambric Graphics, Inc. 
e. The bank accounts, furnishings, fixtures, 
personal effects, and other personal property now in 
defendant's possession. 
f. Defendant shall pay and discharge all debts 
incurred by him since the parties' separation in August 1995. 
g. The defendant shall, on or before June 30, 
1996, pay to the defendant the $925 referred to in Paragraph 6d 
above. 
00342129 
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h. Defendant shall, within ten days after 
entry of the Decree of Divorce, pay and discharge the Zion's 
Bank automobile loan secured by the title on the Subaru 
automobile being awarded to the plaintiff and defendant shall 
save and hold plaintiff harmless from said obligation. 
i. Except as specifically provided in 
Paragraph 6f above, the defendant shall pay and discharge all 
outstanding debts and obligations (including unsecured credit 
card debts in the approximate amount of $11,700) incurred 
during the marriage and shall save and hold plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
j. Defendant shall pay and discharge his own 
attorneys' fees and costs in this action. 
8. The parties shall file joint federal and state 
income tax returns for the calendar year 1995. The defendant 
shall pay and discharge any and all tax liabilities for 1995 
and shall save and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. If 
there is any federal or state income tax refund for calendar 
year 1995, the same shall be divided equally between the 
parties. 
9. The defendant shall save and hold the plaintiff 
harmless from any and all federal and state tax liabilities, 
penalties and interest for all years for which the parties 
filed joint tax returns. 
10. For so long as the defendant has a duty to pay 
child support, he shall maintain insurance upon his life with 
185\94323 1 ® 
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unencumbered death benefits in an amount of not less than 
$150,000, payable to the plaintiff in her capacity as natural 
mother and court-appointed guardian of the children who are of 
issue of the marriage and to be used by her for the use and 
benefit of said children only as allowed by order of the 
supervisory court. 
11. For so long as the defendant has a duty to pay 
alimony he shall maintain insurance upon his life with 
unencumbered death benefits in an amount of not less than 
$100,000 payable to the plaintiff. 
12. There is awarded to the defendant in his 
capacity as a Trustee, 214,63 9 shares of common stock in 
Cambric Graphics, Inc. The defendant shall hold and deal with 
the same as Trustee for the sole and exclusive use and benefit 
of the two minor children who are of issue of this marriage 
pursuant to the terms of a Trust Agreement to be prepared, 
agreed to and executed by the plaintiff and defendant pursuant 
to this Judgment and Decree of Divorce. The said Trust 
Agreement shall, in addition to normal and usual provision^ 
with respect to investing and preserving the assets and income 
of the trust for the use and benefit of the children, provide 
(i) for annual accountings to be made by the defendant to the 
plaintiff in her capacity as guardian of the children, (ii) for 
disbursement for the benefit of the children for their health, 
education, welfare, missions for the Church of Jesus Christ; of 
Latter Day Saints and for their post-high school education, 
7
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with the corpus to be distributed to the children in equal 
shares upon their respective 25th birthdays, and (iii) in the 
event of defendant's death Zions Bank and Trust Company shall 
become the substitute trustee. 
13. There is granted to the plaintiff the right to 
resume the use of her maiden name of Jane Ann Taylor and to be 
known thereby. 
14. The parties shall cooperate and execute such 
documents and make such deliveries and do such things that are 
necessary to implement the terms hereof, including, if 
necessary, preparation, approval and submittal to the Court for 
entry, Qualified Domestic Relations Orders. 
DATED this J day of J'^ feyflJyY'- ,19 °\ U 
Glen R.—Dawson, Judge p/x> T^AMJ^OTC 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
The plaintiff and the defendant stipulate to the 
foregoing and move the Court for immediate entry of the 
foregoing Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
KJA £\a/t 
Jane Ann Taylor Hansen, 
Plaintiff 
Marc Richard Hansen, 
Defendant 
Att 
, /O^A^C^JC^ ^ ^ 
e s P \ Cowley, 
t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
' a t r i c i a A. 0 ' R o r k e , 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James P. Cowley (073 9) .,, , .:'r;^  
Attorneys for Plaintiff 'yt"> ' 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 r^—r-.- - : •"-"".:""""* 
P. O. Box 4 534 0 v " 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANE ANN TAYLOR HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARC RICHARD HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT ANl|> 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 954701212 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
Based upon the matters on file herein, including the 
Affidavit of plaintiff, and the Stipulation and Motion of th^ 
parties endorsed hereon and good cause appearing, the Court now 
makes and enters these 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide resident 
of Davis County, state of Utah for a period of more than three 
months prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married in Salt Lake City, Utah on March 10, 198|9. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of this 
marriage: Krista Ann Hansen, born July 10, 1991, and Taylor1 
v\4? 
Marc Hansen, born January 21, 1993. No other children are 
expected. 
4. There are irreconcilable differences between the 
parties which make the continuation of their marital 
relationship impossible. 
5. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be 
awarded custody of the parties' minor children. It is in the 
best interest of the parties' two minor children that their 
custody be awarded to Plaintiff, reserving to the defendant the 
right to visit with the children at all reasonable times and 
places. 
6. The defendant has a high school education. He 
is employed full-time and has a gross income of $90,000 per 
year. The plaintiff has a college education. She has been 
employed in the past but has not been gainfully employed for a 
number of years. Plaintiff properly devotes her time and 
attention to the care of the children and it is in their best
 v 
interest that she continue to do s o . ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ 1 ^ - . pC_ 
7. All matters relating to child custody, child 
support, property division, and alimony have been agreed to by 
the parties and are set forth in detail in the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce submitted by the parties and entered 
contemporaneously herewith. The Court finds that the 
provisions agreed to by the parties as set forth in the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce are in all respects fair, just, 
^ 
appropriate and equitable and the Court by this finding 
ratifies, confirms and approves the same. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Courjt 
now makes its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and the parties. 
2. The Court should make and enter that Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce submitted contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this _\ day of -^J^^LKM/ , 19 ^ U " :^^A^AA
Clon R.—Dawson, Judge ^ >T-^^ f*^ 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
The plaintiff and the defendant stipulate to the 
foregoing and move the Court for immediate entry of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
fane Ann Taylor/Hansen, Ja
plaintiff 
Janfles P. \\Cowley, 
A t t o r n e y f o r p l a i n t i 
4M& 
Marc Richard Hansen, 
defendant 
Patricia A. O'Rorfe^ 
Attorney for defendant 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James P. Cowley (073 9) 
Pamela Martinson (6273) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
JANE ANN TAYLOR HANSEN 
JANE 
MARC 
ANN TAYLOR 
RICHARD 
vs. 
HANSEN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
HANSEN, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Civil No. 954701212 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss . 
Jane Ann Taylor Hansen, being duly sworn under oatl"j, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
I make this Affidavit on the basis of my personal knowledge. 
2. I was a resident of Davis County, State of Ut^h, 
for more than three months prior to the filing of this actiorf. 
3. The Defendant and I were married in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on March 10, 1989. Two children have been born as 
issue of our marriage: Krista Ann Hansen, born July 10, 1991], 
£\ 
and Taylor Marc Hansen, born January 21, 1993. No other 
children are expected. 
4. There are irreconcilable differences between us 
which constitute grounds for divorce pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-3-1. We have been separated on several 
occasions, and have attempted to resolve our differences through 
marriage counseling, numerous conversations and the help of 
family members. Despite these efforts, it is impossible for the 
Defendant and I to reconcile our differences and live together 
as husband and wife. 
5. Public assistance has not and is not being 
provided to me. 
6. Attached hereto is a Universal Income Withholding 
Information Sheet that I have prepared and that is accurate. 
7. I am not employed. The defendant is employed and 
earns a gross income of $7500 per month. That is verified by 
his 1994 Tax Return, a copy of which is attached hereto. In 
addition, I have verified the same by reference to his current 
paychecks. Furthermore, the defendant's testimony on deposition 
establishes his income of $7500 per month. 
8. The defendant and I have endorsed our Stipulation 
and Motion for entry upon the Findings and Decree. The Findings 
and Decree are consistent in every respect with the Complaint on 
file herein and with our agreed settlement of the matter. 
9. There is attached hereto a Statement of 
Compliance with respect to child support. The child support 
required by the Judgment is consistent with the guidelines. 
DATED this 'Lb day of \lf^/irj/7r£A/ ,19 96. 
Jane Ann Taylor Hansen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this QXp day of 
OWli/aA^A^ , 1996. 
My Commission Expires: 
Y PUBLI 
Resid ing a t : c^ OU-A Lojfrj? ( 1 b , U \ 
NOTARY HJ6UC 
BftEMOALfrUMMOUO 
808ouftlMn#ie00 
6ttUft»G%,l/T§4144 
JufctMOT 
fTAflOTUTAM 
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MARC RICHARD HANSEN 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT AND DECLARATION OF TRUST 
This Agreement and Declaration entered into this day of Much 1996 by jnd 
between Marc Richard Hansen of Salt Lake City, Utah, ("Settlor"), Marc Richard Hansen 
as Trustee in Trust for Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen, minor children ("Trustee") and 
Jane Ann Taylor ("Jane"). 
W I T N E S S E T H : Whereas, as part of a divorce settlement agreement, and 
I tmstidiit io tin Imil^ iin nl and Decree of Divorce dated February 1, 1996, and filed by the 
county clerk at David County on February 2, 1996 in Jane Ann Taylor Hansen vs. Marc 
Richard Hansen, Civil No. 954701212, ("Decree"), Settlor and Jane desire to establish an 
irrevocable trust for the use and benefit of their minor children, Krista Hansen and Taylor 
Hansen; 
Now, Therefore, effective this day of March, 1996, Trustor, Jane and Trustee 
hereby establish an irrevocable trust to provide as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
Trust Estate. Trustor, desiring to establish an in vivos irrevocable trust does hereby 
give, convey, transfer and assign to Trustee 214,639 shares of common stock of Cambric 
Graphics, Ltd. ("Stock"), to hold, manage and distribute in accordance with the provisions 
of this trust agreement and Trustee accepts this transfer, assignment and designation in trust 
for the uses and purposes set forth in this trust agreement. Attached hereto as Exhibit A 
is the stock certificate issued by Cambric Graphics, Ltd for 214,639 shares of its common 
stock in the name of Marc Richard Hansen, Trustee in Trust for Krista Hansen and Taylor 
Hansen. 
The Trust Estate shall also include cash and stock dividends, stock splits and 
intangibles of every kind and description which arise directly or indirectly from the 
ownership of said shares of stock. 
ARTICLE 2 
Voting Right. During the term of this trust prior to distribution to the beneficiaries 
hereof, Trustee shall be entitled to exercise voting rights over said stock. 
ARTICLE 3 
Dividends. Additional stock resulting from stock dividends, stock splits or other 
intangible rights associated with said common stock shall be retained by Trustee as part of 
the Trust Estate. 
Cash dividends shall be immediately paid and distributed directly to the custodial 
parent or the guardian of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen. 
ARTICLE 4 
Successor Trustee. In the event that Trustee herein designated ceases or fails so to 
serve for any reason, including but not limited to death or disability, Jane shall become 
Trustee in his stead. In the event that Jane shall fail or shall cease to act as Trustee for any 
reason, Zions First National Bank shall act as substitute Trustee in her place. 
ARTICLE 5 
Disposition of the Trust Estate During the Term of the Trust. 
The Stock and other property of the Trust Estate may not be encumbered, sold, 
transferred or otherwise disposed of without first obtaining the written consent of Jane, or 
222705 i - 2 -
in the event of her prior death or disability, the legal guardian of Krista Hansen and Taylor 
Hansen during their minority or their respective consents after reaching the age of majority. 
Subject to all of the foregoing provisions herein, the Trustee shall hold all of the 
Trust Estate solely foi the use and benefit of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen. It is the 
desire of the Settlor and Jane to utilize the Trust assets for the sole and exclusive benefit 
I if i'lirii (wo minor rhildrcu, Krista Hansen •• Taylor Hansen, In .mil including their 
respective 18th birthdays. Upon their respectively reaching the age of 18 years, Trustor and 
Jane desire that one-half of the assets then existing in the Trust Estate be allocated to each 
of the beneficiaries and utilized, in addition to necessary maintenance and medical and 
dental coverage, to assist them respectively, in their educational, trade school or IDS 
missionai y expei ience needs. Payments or distributions to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries either before or after their reaching the age of 18 years shall not diminish in 
a ill) way Settlor's obligation to pay child support under the Decree. 
Upon the day that Krista reaches the age of 25 years, the assets of the Trust Estate 
allocated to her shall be directly, immediately and unconditionally distributed r. Upon 
the day that Taylor reaches the age of 25 years, the assets of the Trust Estate allocated to 
him shall be directly, immediately and unconditionally distributed to him and this Trust shall 
terminate. 
In the event that either Krista or Taylor shall not survive to the date of the 
termination of this I rust, his or her interest shall be immediately allocated to the survivor 
of Krista and Taylor. In the event that both of them shall die before reaching their 25th 
222705 I - 3 -
birthday, all of the assets of the Trust Estate shall be immediately transferred to Jane and 
this Trust shall terminate. 
ARTICLE 6 
Powers of the Trustee. In addition to the powers specifically herein bestowed 
upon Trustee, Trustee shall have general trustee powers as provided by Utah statutes and 
regulations. 
ARTICLE 7 
Compensation of Trustee. The Trustee shall receive no compensation for his or her 
services in performing the duties of Trustee. If Zions First National Bank is appointed 
substitute trustee under the provisions hereof and of the Decree, it shall be entitled to 
reasonable compensation for so acting. 
ARTICLE 8 
Applicable Law. The validity and construction of this Trust Agreement and 
Declaration shall be controlled by the laws of the state of Utah. 
ARTICLE 9 
If the validity of any provision of this Trust Agreement shall be unenforceable, the 
remaining provisions, nevertheless, shall be carried into effect. 
ARTICLE 10 
Revocability. It is the intention of Settlor, Trustee and Jane that this Trust 
Agreement and Declaration shall be completely irrevocable; it is their mutual intention that 
Mark Richard Hansen shall, under no circumstances, retain a beneficial interest in the Trust 
assets or benefit personally in any way from the existence of the Trust. 
222705 1 - 4 -
ARTICLE 11 
Trustee shall make an annual accounting to Jane in her capacity as guardian of 
Krista aod Taylor as of December 31 of each year. Said accounting shall be provided to 
Jane not later than January 31 of each year. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Irrevocable Trust 
A greement ad Declaration of Trust this day of March, 1996. 
Marc Richard Hansen, Settlor 
Marc Richard Hansen, Trustee 
Jane Ann Taylor Hansen 
222705 I - 5 -
TabG 
MARC RICHARD HANSEN 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT AND DECLARATION OF TRUST 
This Irrevocable Trust Agreement ("Agreement") and Declaration entered into by and 
between Marc Richard Hansen of Salt Lake City, Utah, ("Settlor"), Marc Richard Hansen as 
Trustee in Trust ('Trustee") for Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen, minor children, and Jane Ann 
Taylor ("Jane"), who are sometimes referred to as "the Parties." 
WHEREAS, the Settlement Agreement executed by Marc Richard Hansen and Jane Ann 
Taylor provided tltat 214,639 of the 429,278 shares of common stock in Cambric Graphics, Inc. 
held in the name of Marc Richard Hansen should be held in trust for the sole and exclusive use 
and benefit of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen; and 
WHEREAS, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered on February 2, 1996 by the 
Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, in the divorce proceeding entitled 
Jane Ann Taylor Hansen v. Marc Richard Hansen, Civil No. 954701212, awarded to Marc 
Richard Hansen in his capacity as Trustee 214,637 shares of stock in Cambric Graphics, Inc. to 
hold and deal with as Trustee for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of Krista Hansen and 
Taylor Hansen pursuant to the terms of a Trust Agreement to be prepared, agreed to an executed 
by Marc Richard Hansen and Jane Ann Taylor; 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties enter this IRREVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT 
and, in consideration for the mutual promises contained herein and the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement and the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, hereby agree to the following terms and 
conditions 
I 
I Conveyance of Stock. Settlor does hereby give, convey, transfer and assign to 
Trustee, and Trustee docs hereby accept, 214,639 shares of common stock of Cambric Graphics, 
Inc. ("the Slock"), to hold, manage and distribute for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of 
Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit A is the stock certificate issued by Cambric Graphics, Inc. for 214,639 shares of its 
common stock in the name of Marc Richard Hansen, Trustee in Trust for Krista Hansen and 
Taylor Hansen. 
2. Name of Trust. This trust shall be known as the Hansen Children's Trust. 
3. Term. The Term of this Trust shall be from the date of this Agreement until the 
twenty-fifth birthday of Taylor Hansen, on January 21, 2018. 
4. Powers of Trustee. During the term of the Trust, the Trustee shall have general 
trustee powers as provided by Utah statutes and regulations. Trustee may, in his discretion, 
exercise all of the voting rights associated with the Stock, sell or transfer the Stock, and invest all 
of the proceeds of the Stock, including but not limited to cash and stock dividends, stock splits, 
and intangibles of every kind and description which arise directly or indirectly from the 
ownership of the Stock, as Trust property for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of Krista 
Hansen and Taylor Hansen. Trustee shall pay any income taxes or other obligations arising from 
the Stock or other Trust property and may take such actions as he deems necessary and 
appropriate to preserve the Trust property for the use and benefit of Krista Hansen and Taylor 
I lansen 
? 
5 Distributions. Trustee shall divide the Trust property into two equal shares, one-
half for the use and benefit of Krista Hansen and one-half for the use and benefit of Taylor 
Hansen. 
a) Trustee shall have discretion to retain or distribute to or for the benefit of 
Krista Hansen part or all of the principal and net income of the one-half portion of the 
Trust property set aside for Krista's use and benefit for Krista's health, education, 
welfare, mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and post-high school 
education. Trustee shall distribute the remainder, if any, of said one-half portion of the 
Trust property to Krista upon her twenty-fifth birthday, July 10, 2016. In the event Krista 
does not survive until July 10, 2016. the remainder of her one-half portion shall be 
distributed to her surviving children in equal shares or, if Krista leaves no surviving child, 
the remainder of her one-half portion shall be distributed to Taylor Hansen together with 
his one-half portion. 
b) Trustee shall have discretion to retain or distribute to or for the benefit of 
Taylor Hansen part or all of the principal and net income of the one-half portion of the 
Trust property set aside for Taylor's use and benefit for Taylor's health, education, 
welfare, mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and post-high school 
education. Trustee shall distribute the remainder, if any, of said one-half portion of the 
Trust property to Taylor upon his twenty-fifth birthday, January 21, 2018. In the event 
Taylor does not survive until January 21, 2018, the remainder of his one-half portion 
shall be distributed to his surviving children in equal shares or, if Taylor leaves no 
> 
surviving child, the remainder of his one-half portion shall be distributed to Knsta 
Hansen together with her one-half portion. 
c) Annually Trustee shall add retained income to the principal of the trust. 
Trustee may, for federal income tax purposes, maintain one or more separate accounts 
reflecting retained income which has been added to principal. 
d) The existence and terms of the Trust shall not limit or effect in any way 
the child support obligations of Trustee set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
6. Annual Accountings. By March 31 of each year, the Trustee shall provide Jane 
Ann Taylor, in her capacity as guardian of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen, an accounting of 
the assets, liabilities, income and expenses of the Trust and all transactions and distributions 
made by the Trust during the preceding calendar year. Copies of the annual accounting shall be 
provided to each Beneficiary after the child reaches the age of eighteen years. 
7. Successor Trustee. In the event that Trustee ceases or fails to serve as trustee for 
any reason, including but not limited to death or disability, Zions First National Bank shall act as 
substitute Trustee in his place. Neither the Trustee nor the Successor Trustee shall be required to 
provide any bond or other security. 
8 Compensation of Trustee. The Trustee shall receive no compensation for his or 
her services in performing the duties of Trustee. If Zions First National Bank becomes substitute 
trustee under the provision of this Agreement and the Decree, it shall be entitled to reasonable 
compensation tor its services. 
4 
9. Applicable Law. The validity and construction of this Trust Agreement and 
Declaration shall be controlled by the laws of the state of Utah. 
10. Severablilty. If the validity of any provision of this Trust Agreement shall be 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall be carried into effect in accordance with the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Irrevocable Trust 
Agreement and Declaration of Trust this *7 day of Apffl, 1996. 
/1M2.J^ 
Marc Richard Hansen, Settlor 
4t10-
Marc Richard Hansen, Trustee 
Approved and Agreed: 
Jane Ann Taylor 
:> 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the _J day of A^lAM
 % 1996, personally appeared before me Marc 
Richard Hansen, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
NotafY Pubfio 
LARiSSAI i 0. CALL | 
2269 We«t 12250 South i 
Rivertoo. Utah 84065 J 
My Comfnbskxi Expires I 
September 14. 1099 | 
Stete^ofJJtrfi^^ j 
My Commission Expires: 
Sh-dML 
Nolary Public 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of. _, 1996, personally appeared before me Jane Ann 
Taylor, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
6 
MARC RICHARD HANSEN 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT AND DECLARATION OF TRUST 
This Agreement and Declaration entered into this day of March, 1996 by and 
between Marc Richard Hansen of Salt Lake City, Utah, ("Settlor"), Marc Richard Hansen 
as Trustee in Trust for Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen, minor children ("Trustee") and 
Jane Ann Taylor ("Jane"). 
W I T N E S S E T H : Whereas, as part of a divorce settlement agreement, and 
pursuant to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce dated February 1, 1996, and filed by the 
county clerk at David County on February 2, 1996 in Jane Ann Taylor Hansen vs. Marc 
Richard Hansen, Civil No. 954701212, ("Decree"), Settlor and Jane desire to establish an 
irrevocable trust for the use and benefit of their minor children, Krista Hansen and Taylor 
Hansen; 
Now, Therefore, effective this day of March, 1996, Trustor, Jane and Trustee 
hereby establish an irrevocable trust to provide as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
Trust Estate. Trustor, desiring to establish an in vivos irrevocable trust does hereby 
give, convey, transfer and assign to Trustee 214,639 shares of common stock of Cambric 
Graphics, Ltd. ("Stock"), to hold, manage and distribute in accordance with the provisions 
of this trust agreement and Trustee accepts this transfer, assignment and designation in trust 
for the uses and purposes set forth in this trust agreement. Attached hereto as Exhibit A 
is the stock certificate issued by Cambric Graphics, Ltd. for 214,639 shares of its common 
stock in the name of Marc Richard Hansen, Trustee in Trust for Krista Hansen and Taylor 
Hansen. 
The Trust Estate shall also include cash and stock dividends, stock splits and 
intangibles of every kind and description which arise directly or indirectly from the 
ownership of said shares of stock. 
ARTICLE 2 
Voting Right. During the term of this trust prior to distribution to the beneficiaries 
hereof, Trustee shall be entitled to exercise voting rights over said stock. 
ARTICLE 3 
Dividends. Additional stock resulting from stock dividends, stock splits or other 
intangible rights associated with said common stock shall be retained by Trustee as part of 
the Trust Estate. 
Cash dividends shall be immediately paid and distributed directly to the custodial 
parent or the guardian of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen. 
ARTICLE 4 
Successor Trustee. In the event that Trustee herein designated ceases or fails so to 
serve for any reason, including but not limited to death or disability, Jane shall become 
Trustee in his stead. In the event that Jane shall fail or shall cease to act as Trustee for any 
reason, Zions First National Bank shall act as substitute Trustee in her place. 
ARTICLE 5 
Disposition of the Trust Estate During the Term of the Trust 
The Stock and other property of the Trust Estate may not be encumbered, sold, 
transferred or otherwise disposed of without first obtaining the written consent of Jane, or 
222705 I - 2 -
in the event of her prior death or disability, the legal guardian of Krista Hansen and Taylor 
Hansen during their minority or their respective consents after reaching the age of majority. 
Subject to all of the foregoing provisions herein, the Trustee shall hold all of the 
Trust Estate solely for the use and benefit of Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen. It is the 
desire of the Settlor and Jane to utilize the Trust assets for the sole and exclusive benefit 
of their two minor children, Krista Hansen and Taylor Hansen, to and including their 
respective 18th birthdays. Upon their respectively reaching the age of 18 years, Trustor and 
Jane desire that one-half of the assets then existing in the Trust Estate be allocated to each 
of the beneficiaries and utilized, in addition to necessary maintenance and medical and 
dental coverage, to assist them respectively, in their educational, trade school or LDS 
missionary experience needs. Payments or distributions to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries either before or after their reaching the age of 18 years shall not diminish in 
any way Settlor's obligation to pay child support under the Decree. 
Upon the day that Krista reaches the age of 25 years, the assets of the Trust Estate 
allocated to her shall be directly, immediately and unconditionally distributed to her. Upon 
the day that Taylor reaches the age of 25 years, the assets of the Trust Estate allocated to 
him shall be directly, immediately and unconditionally distributed to him and this Trust shall 
terminate. 
In the event that either Krista or Taylor shall not survive to the date of the 
termination of this Trust, his or her interest shall be immediately allocated to the survivor 
of Krista and Taylor. In the event that both of them shall die before reaching their 25th 
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birthday, all of the assets of the Trust Estate shall be immediately transferred to Jane and 
this Trust shall terminate. 
ARTICLE 6 
Powers of the Trustee. In addition to the powers specifically herein bestowed 
upon Trustee, Trustee shall have general trustee powers as provided by Utah statutes and 
regulations. 
ARTICLE 7 
Compensation of Trustee. The Trustee shall receive no compensation for his or her 
services in performing the duties of Trustee. If Zions First National Bank is appointed 
substitute trustee under the provisions hereof and of the Decree, it shall be entitled to 
reasonable compensation for so acting. 
ARTICLE 8 
Applicable Law. The validity and construction of this Trust Agreement and 
Declaration shall be controlled by the laws of the state of Utah. 
ARTICLE 9 
If the validity of any provision of this Trust Agreement shall be unenforceable, the 
remaining provisions, nevertheless, shall be carried into effect. 
ARTICLE 10 
Revocability. It is the intention of Settlor, Trustee and Jane that this Trust 
Agreement and Declaration shall be completely irrevocable; it is their mutual intention that 
Mark Richard Hansen shall, under no circumstances, retain a beneficial interest in the Trust 
assets or benefit personally in any way from the existence of the Trust. 
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ARTICLE 11 
Trustee shall make an annual accounting to Jane in her capacity as guardian of 
Krista and Taylor as of December 31 of each year. Said accounting shall be provided to 
Jane not later than January 31 of each year. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Irrevocable Trust 
Agreement ad Declaration of Trust this day of March, 1996. 
Marc Richard Hansen, Settlor 
Marc Richard Hansen, Trustee 
Jane Ann Taylor Hansen 
222705J - 5 -
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LAW O F F I C E S 
O'RORKE & GARDINER. LLC 
SUITE 4 7 0 
6 9 9 3 UNION PARK C C N T C R 
PAfPrCiA A o«Q«KC MIOVALG. UTAH 8 4 Q 4 7 
April 9, 1996 
Pamela Martinson 
VanCott, Bagely, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Re: Hansen \> Hansen 
Dear Pam: 
I am writing with respect lo the payments of alimony, child support, medical 
insurance, medical expenses, and child care expenses for the I lanscns' children, and the 
draft trust agreement. I hope we can establish a more workable format for the parties to 
handle these expenses on an on-going basis without our involvement, and complete the 
trust agreement as soon as possible. 
First, we need a functional method for Marc to deliver the monthly payment for 
alimony and child support. Jane moved from the address to which he was sending the 
checks and did not give him a forwarding address. Since then, he has been asked to 
deposit the support payments in an account at Merrill Lynch rather than mailing them to 
Jane. Marc mailed this month's check to Merrill Lynch at its office in downtown Salt 
Lake City. It would be more convenient to deposit the payments into an account with a 
bank which has branches in Draper or Sandy or to mail the payment to Jane at her current 
address. Marc requests that Jane or Keith or you deliver a letter to him telling him 
exactly where and how the payments should be made. 
Second, the Decree provides for the parties to share the children's unreimbursed 
medical expenses equally. Marc requests that when Jane sends him a request for such 
payments, she provide a written statement listing the expenses and slating that they are 
ncccssarv medical expenses incurred for the benefit of Krista and or Taylor, with receipts 
rellccting the child who received the care, the treatment or diagnosis, and the name, 
address and telephone number of the doctor or health caregiver Jane recently sent Marc 
a list of medical expenses showing a total owed by Marc of SI 69 00 One of the invoices 
included a past due amount ol $62.00 with no description of who was treated and another 
$1 > 00 charge had no receipt lo back it up. I am enclosing Marc s check for $1 ^0.51. He 
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wi l l send the rcmamclei when Jane sends receipls Perhaps vou could give Jane a form (o 
use so that (his procedure is s imp l i f ied . 
Third, the Decree provides for Marc to pay one-half ol any child care expenses 
incurred by Jane as a result of her career, occupational training or employment. Jane sent 
Marc a request for child care payment without any of the verification required under the 
statute Would you please ask Jane to provide a statement indicating her current 
employment or training program, the schedule, a statement indicating that the receipts are 
for child care expenses for Krista and/or Taylor incurred while she was employed or in 
training, and receipts for the expenses showing the child receiving the day care, the dates 
and times, and the name, address and telephone number of the child care provider. If she 
has a regular schedule and child care provider, perhaps Marc could make his 50% 
payment directly to the provider. 
Fourth, the Decree provides for the health insurance premiums for the children to 
be deducted from the child support payments. The health insurance premiums for the 
children which are deducted from Marc 's salary are $87 56 per month. I am enclosing a 
copy of a memo from the Controller of Marc's employer verifying the amount. 
Regmnmg in June, Marc will deduct $43.78 from the child support due each month 
Rather than deducting the premiums for the prior five months, which amount to $218.90, 
from the monthly payment. I suggest that this amount be deducted from the payment due 
to Jane in June, 1996. Please let me know your thoughts regarding this suggestion. 
Finally, the draft trust agreement which Keith Taylor sent me diverged from the 
terms provided in the settlement agreement and Decree. I will send you a revised draft 
acceptable to Marc and me within a few days 
Thanks for your assistance in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Patricia A O'Rorke 
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